Interactive expertise : studies in distributed working intelligence by Engeström, Yrjö
      Opiskelijakirjaston verkkojulkaisu 2006
      Interactive Expertise
Studies in Distributed Working Intelligence
      Yrjö Engeström
Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of Education, 1992
ISBN 951-45-6146-5
Tämä aineisto on julkaistu verkossa oikeudenhaltijoiden luvalla.
Aineistoa ei saa kopioida, levittää tai saattaa muuten yleisön saataviin
ilman oikeudenhaltijoiden lupaa. Aineiston verkko-osoitteeseen saa
viitata vapaasti. Aineistoa saa opiskelua, opettamista ja tutkimusta
varten tulostaa omaan käyttöön muutamia kappaleita.
www.opiskelijakirjasto.lib.helsinki.fi
opiskelijakirjasto-info@helsinki.fi
RESEARCH BULLETIN 83
Yrjö Engeström
INTERACTIVE EXPERTISE
Studies in Distributed Working Intelligence
Helsinki 1992
.
ISBN 951-45-6146-5
ISSN 0359-5749
Helsinki 1992
Yliopistopaino
University of Helsinki
Department of Education
Research Bulletin 83, 1992
Yrjö Engeström
INTERACTIVE EXPERTISE: STUDIES IN DISTRIBUTED WORKING
INTELLIGENCE
Abstract
Expertise has been understood as a property of an individual professional or
craftsman. On the basis of the cultural-historical theory of activity, a radically
different perspective is suggested. Expertise is here seen as an interactive
accomplishment, constructed in encounters and exchanges between people and
their mediating artifacts.
The report contains four studies. The first study (Chapter 1) is a
preliminary theoretical framework for the study of expertise as mediated
collaborative activity. The second study (Chapter 2) is a cross-cultural analysis
of judicial expertise displayed in municipal courts handling cases of driving
under  the  influence  of  alcohol  in  Finland  and  in  California.  In  this  study,  the
multi-voicedness and internal tensions of expert work are highlighted, using
taperecorded courtroom discourse as data. The third study (Chapter 3) is an
analysis of expertise in another court setting in California where a complex case
of civil litigation was tried. This study focuses on disturbances and innovations
in the trial interactions, using the official court reporter's transcripts of sidebar
discussions as data. The data is analyzed with the help of a three-pronged model
of coordination, cooperation and communication as fundamental forms of
interaction. The fourth study (Chapter 4) is an analysis of expertise in multi-
professional medical teams working in Finnish health centers. Videotaped and
taperecorded meetings of multi-professional teams are analyzed with the help of
the three-pronged model mentioned above.
The studies reported here show how expertise is constructed interactively
in everyday problem situations. The studies also demonstrate that purely
situational analyses of discourse are insufficient as attempts to explain expertise.
The disturbances, innovations and transitions found in the data can be accounted
for when analyzed within the framework of historically evolving activity
systems and their inner contradictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Expertise has been understood as a property of an individual professional or
craftsman. In this volume, I suggest a radically different perspective. Expertise is
here seen as an interactive accomplishment, constructed in encounters and
exchanges between people and their artifacts.
The volume contains four chapters. In the first chapter, I present a
preliminary theoretical framework for the study of expertise as mediated
collaborative activity. The second chapter is a cross-cultural study of judicial
expertise displayed in municipal courts handling cases of driving under the
influence of alcohol in Finland and in California. The third chapter is a study of
expertise in another court setting in California where a complex case of civil
litigation was tried. The fourth chapter is a study of expertise in multi-professional
medical teams working in Finnish health centers.
The three empirical studies are examples of ongoing research in legal and medical
expert work settings (see Engeström & al., 1989; 1990; Engeström, Haavisto &
Pihlaja, 1992). Chapter 2 is based on a paper authored jointly by Yrjö Engeström.
Kathy Brown, Ritva Engeström, Judith Gregory, Vaula Haavisto, Juha Pihlaja,
Robert Taylor, and Chi-Cheng Wu, presented at the Annual Conference of the
American Anthropological Association in New Orleans in November 1990. An
elaborated version of this paper will appear in the volume Cognition and
Communication at Work, edited by Yrjö Engeström and David Middleton
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Chapter 3 is based on a paper authored
jointly by Yrjö Engeström, Kathy Brown, Carol Christopher, and Judith Gregory,
presented at the Annual Conference of the Law and Society Association in
Amsterdam in June 1991, and published in the October 1991 issue of The
Quarterly Newsletter of the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition
(Vol. 13, Number 4, p. 88-97). Chapter 4 is based on a paper presented at the
conference The Complex Social Problems and Psychology: Praxis, Common Sense,
Hegemony', organized by Institute) Gramsci Emilia-Romagna and Maison des
Sciences de l'Homme in Bologna in December 1991. Versions of this paper were
also presented at the conference 'Expertise as Collaborative Activity', held in San
Diego in December 1991, and at the First International Conference in the Memory
of B. F. Lomov, held in Moscow in December 1991.
The studies presented in this volume should be seen as preliminary
groundwork toward a cross-cultural research program on expertise as
collaborative activity, particulary as it is manifested in teams and network
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organizations. I thank the members of my research groups in San Diego and
Helsinki without whom this volume would not have emerged. I also thank the
Department of Education of the University of Helsinki for including this
volume in its publication series. Comments received from individual
colleagues are acknowledged at the end of each chapter.
Helsinki, April 1992
Yrjö Engeström
1. EXPERTISE AS MEDIATED COLLABORATIVE
ACTIVITY
CARTESIAN APPROACHES TO EXPERTISE
In recent years, the cognitive bases of expertise have become a central problem
of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Despite important achievements
in these fields, I will argue that our understanding of expert thinking and its
formation at work is in need of a major transformation.
There is a pervasive dichotomy in our western culture concerning human
thought. The dichotomy is expressed in number of related versions: analytical
vs. intuitive; explicit vs. tacit; scientific vs. experiential; paradigmatic vs.
narrative, and so on. Collins (1990) characterizes the two poles of the
dichotomy as 'algorithmic' and enculturational'.
"We can contrast two models of learning: an 'algorithmic model,' in which knowledge is
clearly statable and transferable in something like the form of a recipe, and an 'enculturational
model,' where the process has more to do with unconscious social contagion." (Collins, 1990,
p. 4)
In studies of expertise, the 'algorithmic' or human information processing
approach was launched by Herbert Simon and his colleagues in studies of
playing chess and solving physics problems (Newell & Simon 1972; Chase &
Simon 1973; Simon & Simon 1978). Two representative collections of recent
research continuing and expanding this tradition are The Nature of Expertise,
edited by Chi, Glaser and Farr (1988), and Toward a General Theory of
Expertise, edited by Ericsson and Smith (1991).
The emphasis of the approach has shifted somewhat from general mechanisms
of perception, memory and problem solving to knowledge-based and domain-
specific issues of expertise. Although the classical well constrained domains of
chess and physics are still the core of experimental research, studies now
include also laboratory simulations of real tasks of professional practice,
chiefly in music, sports, medicine, law, and computer programming.
In their introductory chapter, Ericsson and Smith (1991) define the study of
expertise as seeking to "understand and account for what distinguishes
outstanding individuals in a domain from less outstanding invididuals in that
domain" (p. 2). They point out that the approach focuses on those cases where
the outstanding behavior can be attributed to "relatively stable characteristics
4of the relevant individuals" (p. 2). The study of expertise is basically
identification or 'capturing' of superior and stable individual performances
reproducible under standardized laboratory conditions. Given these
requirements, it is no surprise that the most frequently studied form of expert
performance is memory for meaningful stimuli from a well constrained task domain.
Ericsson and Smith summarize the empirical findings of the human information
processing approach to expertise as follows.
The superior performance consists of faster response times for the tasks in the domain, where we
include the superior speed of expert typists, pianists, and Morse code operators. In addition,
chess experts exhibit superior ability to plan ahead while selecting a move (...). In a wide range of
task domains experts have been found to exhibit superior memory performance." (p. 25-26)
In the overview of their volume, Glaser and Chi (1988, p. xvii-xx) summarize their
view of the central findings of this approach in the form of seven points: (1) experts
excel mainly in their own domains; (2) experts perceive large meaningful patterns
in their domain; (3) experts are fast: they are faster than novices at performing the
skills of their domain, and they quickly solve problems with little error, (4)
experts have superior short-term and long-term memory; (5) experts see and
represent a problem in their domain at a deeper (more principled) level than novices;
novices tend to represent a problem at a superficial level; (6) experts spend a great
deal of time analyzing a problem qualitatively; and finally (7) experts have strong
self-monitoring skills.
In his concluding chapter to the Ericsson & Smith volume, Holyoak (1991, p. 303-
304) puts together a fairly similar list: (1) experts perform complex tasks in their
domains much more accurately than do novices; (2) experts solve problems in
their domains with greater ease than do novices; (3) expertise develops from
knowledge initially acquired by weak methods, such as means-ends analysis; (4)
expertise is based on the automatic evocation of actions by conditions; (5) experts
have superior memory related to their domains; (6) experts are better at perceiving
patterns among task-related cues; (7) expert problem-solvers search forward from
given information rather than backward from goals; (8) one's degree of expertise
increases steadily with practice; (9) learning requires specific goals and clear
feedback; (10) expertise is highly domain-specific; (11 ) teaching expert rules
results in expertise; (12) performances of experts can be predicted accurately
from knowledge of the rules they claim to use.
In contrast to the 'algorithmic' aproach, the 'enculturational' approach to expertise
sees thinking and knowledge as embedded in social situations, practices and
cultures. Knowledge and thought cannot be divorced from the corresponding skills
and actions. As Collins (1987, p. 331) points out, "an apprenticeship, or at least a
period of interpersonal interaction, is thought to be the necessary prelude to the
transfer of skill-related knowledge." The mastery exhibited by an expert is
above all tacit and intuitive. It is based on
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years of practical experience, not on teaching of verbalized concepts and explicit
algorithms. A strong formulation of this approach was put forward by Hubert and
Stuart Dreyfus (1986) in their Mind over Machine (see also Benner, 1984). A
collection of research within this approach may be found in the volume
Knowledge, Skill and Artificial Intelligence, edited by Göranzon and Josefson
(1988). Proponents of this approach seek philosophical support in the works of
Polanyi and late Wittgenstein (e.g., Nyfri & Smith, 1988).
The two approaches are commonly presented as mutually exclusive rivals. There
is in fact one very conspicuous aspect in which they seem to represent opposing
views, namely the explicitness or verbalizability of expert thinking and
knowledge. For Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986, p. 30), "an expert's skill has become so
much  a  part  of  him  that  he  need  be  no  more  aware  of  it  than  he  is  of  his  own
body." For Glaser and Chi (1988, p. xx), "experts seem to be more aware than
novices of when they make errors, why they fail to comprehend, and when they
need to check their solutions." Dreyfus and Dreyfus see expert thinking as typically a
nonsymbolic process, whereas Glaser and others seem to take some sort of
symbolization for granted.
However, this difference is less absolute than it first seems. Robert Hamm (1988)
points out that the degree of explicitness and verbalization, as well as the use of
analytical or intuitive mode of thinking, are dependent of the task at hand. Tasks of
lonely problem solving in a familiar domain are often accomplished without
externally noticeable symbolic means. Tasks requiring negotiation and agreement
between members of a team can hardly be accomplished without some sort of
explicit symbolic means.
Whatever importance the differences between the two approaches may have, their
fundamental similarities are striking. These similarities have been largely overlooked
in the literature, probably because they are mainly taken as self-evident by
proponents of both approaches. They may be expressed in the form of three central
propositions. I will formulate these three ideas polemically. The first part of each
proposition is a positive statement, the latter part expresses a negative implication
of the first part.
1. Expertise is universal and homogeneous. The basic features of expertise in
general are culturally and historically invariant cognitive mechanisms. The
aim is to identify 'the expert' in a given field. There is no need to differentiate
between alternative, substantively and culturally different types of expertise.
2. Expertise consists of superior and stable individual mastery of discrete tasks
and skills. The understanding of expertise does not require that a more
encompassing social context of practice is taken as a unit of analysis.
3. Expertise is acquired through internalization of experience, gained
gradually by massive amounts of practice in the skills exhibited by the
6established masters of the given specialty (the famous novice-master
continuum). Expertise does not include questioning or reconceptualizing the
skills and knowledge of established masters, nor the generation of culturally
novel models of practice.
These three are core ideas of a Cartesian view which depicts the mind as a
lonely, enclosed clockwork (see Markova, 1982). Cartesianism goes hand in
hand with technocentrism and with an inability to conceptualize the creation of
new culture. As Collins (1990, p. 82) points out, the problem comes from
treating expertise as a property of the individual rather than interaction of the
social collectivity, for "it is in the collectivity that novel responses become
legitimate displays of expertise."
In the following, I will assess critically each of the Cartesian assumptions about
expertise and present a set of alternative assumptions. First, however, it is
important to point out that in various branches of studies of cognition,
technology and work, the limits of Cartesianism are currently being
questioned. Two examples will suffice to demonstrate this.
AT THE LIMITS OF CARTESIANISM
In his recent book on human errors, James Reason (1990) differentiates
between active errors that have almost immediate effects and latent errors
whose  consequences  may  lie  dormant  with  the  system  for  a  long  time.  The
former are associated with the performance of 'front-line' operators while the
latter are typically associated with design, decision-making, construction,
management and maintenance.
"Detailed analyses of recent accidents (...) have made it increasingly apparent that latent errors pose the
greatest threat to the safety of a complex system. In the past, reliability analyses and accident
investigations have focused primarily upon active operator errors and equipment failures. While
operators can, and frequently do, make errors in their attempts to recover from an out-of-tolerance
system state, many of the root causes of the emergency were usually present within the system long
before these active errors were committed." (Reason, 1990, p. 173)
Reason offers an analogy between latent failures in complex systems and
'resident pathogens' in the human body. Complex systems contain built-in
weaknesses or potentially destructive agencies.
The resident pathogen notion directs attention to the indicators of 'system morbidity' that are present
prior to a catastrophic breakdown. These, in principle, are more open to detection than the often
bizarre and unforeseeable nature of the local triggering events." (Reason, 1990, p. 198)
These ideas take human error research close to its limits. The focus is shifted
from individual operators and equipment components to entire organizations
and systems of production. However, the notion of resident pathogens is only
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an analogy, borrowed from medicine. It is not yet a conceptual tool suited for
analyses  of  latent  failures.  An  exciting  new  vision  is  opened  -  but  the  lack  of
adequate theoretical instruments leaves the reader in a state of mild
disappointment.
In a new paper, Rob Kling (in press) asks why applications of computer-
supported cooperative work (CSCW), or 'groupware', have been so slow to be
adopted. He points out that a key dilemma lies in the CSCW movement's
reliance on positively loaded terms, like 'cooperation' and 'collaboration,' to
characterize work - and an effective taboo in examining conflict, control,
coercion, and contradiction in work settings. This taboo makes many CSCW
analyses unable to understand the actual uses of groupware.
Kling demonstrates that the dominant latent theory of CSCW researchers
depicts work as "the integration and harmonious adjustment of individual work
efforts towards the accomplishment of a larger goal" (Ellis & al., 1991, p. 43).
Kling suggests that researchers should examine a variety of social relationships
in workplaces - cooperative, conflictual, competitive, etc. - in order to create
more realistic images of the likely uses of the CSCW systems.
Kling's analysis takes CSCW research close to its limits. The focus is shifted
from groupware technologies and idealized collaborative groups to the social
relationships and structures of entire organizations. But again, the conceptual
tools are not yet there.
Even the CSCW movement, in spite of its emphasis on cooperation, has largely
been a prisoner of the Cartesian idea of the individual mind as the fundamental
unit of analysis, regarding cooperation simply as harmonious adjustment of
individual work efforts.' Without stating it explicitly, both Reason and Kling
point toward the need to overcome the confines of Cartesianism in the study
and development of human work.
EXPERTISE IS HETEROGENEOUS AND MULTI-VOICED
Proponents of Cartesian approaches to expertise speak confidently of 'the
expert chess player', 'the expert physicist', etc. The existence of different
concurrent and historically successive schools of expertise in the given field is
tacitly disregarded. Yet even in chess there are different approaches, schools,
or cultures of playing. It is these very differences, implying the possibility of
clashes and hybrids between qualitatively distinct approaches, that make a field
of expertise dynamic. Recall the excitement of the world championship games
between Robert Fisher and Boris Spasski, representing two entirely different
cultures of chess.
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Glaser (1987, p. 92) has recently admitted that his "picture of expertise is probably
biased by the highly structured domains in which it has been studied, and the demands
of situations in which cognitive expertise has been analyzed." Glaser refers to the
distinction made by Hatano and Inagaki (1983) between 'routine expertise' and
'adaptive expertise'. This may be regarded as an important departure from the
notion of universal expertise. But it still remains formal, detached from the
substantive cultural contents of expertise.
Holyoak (1991, p. 304-309) lists an impressive number of empirical
inconsistencies and theoretical anomalies found in cognitive research on
expertise. These make the validity of supposedly universal characteristics of
expertise highly questionable: "there appears to be no single 'expert way' to perform
all tasks" (Holyoak, 1991, p. 309). Holyoak's own suggestion is to rebuild
theories of expertise on the connectionist approach in cognitive science,
combined with aspects of more traditional theorizing on symbolic representation.
While connectionist network models offer a promising possibility to account for
the formal mechanisms behind the diversity and flexibility of individual expert
performances, again they say nothing about the origination and importance of the
different substantive theories and collective orientations, or points of view held by
experts.
In a paper on judicial decision-making, Jeanette Lawrence cautiously
challenges the universality of expertise from a more content-oriented angle.
The expert judge represents each new case against his or her acquired frames of reference or
constructions of reality. (...) People's implicit cognitions are not usually represented together in the
same model as the procedural steps that they take to solve specific problems. We need to describe
how an expert's a priori perspectives operate in interaction with procedures for making sense of data
and generating solutions." (Lawrence, 1988, p. 230)
Lawrence introduces the crucial factor of 'frames of reference' in order to show
how the judges define a problem space, set limits on what it contain, and focus
attention on its features. The frame of reference contains the judge's sentencing
objectives, view of offense, personal role definition, and penal philosophy.
There are two key issues involved here. The first issue is whether the frames of
reference are truly alternative qualitative orientations or just different stages or
steps on a single path toward 'complete' expertise. Supposing that frames of
reference are indeed true qualitative alternatives, the second issue is whether the
different frames of reference entail also qualitatively different procedures of
problem solving and decision-making. Lawrence's findings give no answers to these
issues. Instead of analyzing alternative types of expertise as suggested by herself, she
ends up comparing novices and experts much in the spirit of dominant approaches.
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Lawerence discusses the frames of reference in terms of personal styles. In passing,
she notes that the notion of frame of reference "picks up the way shared values
and outlooks place certain constructions on reality for professional and cultural
groups" (Lawrence, 1988, p. 231, italics added). The universality of expertise
becomes much more questionable if we take seriously the deeply cultural and social
nature of the qualitative differences in expert thinking. Jay Katz takes takes up this
aspect in his discussion of physicians' coping with uncertainty.
The public, and professionals as well, need to become more aware of the fact that many disparate
groups now live under medicine's tent. Contemporary medicine is not a unitary profession but a
federation of professions with differing ideologies and senses of mission. This diversification has
changed medical practices." (Katz, 1984, p. 189)
David Tuckett takes the heterogeneity argument one step further. His book on doctor-
patient interaction is appropriately titled Meetings between Experts (Tuckett & al.,
1985). The title refers to the fact that in a consultation both the doctor and the patient
bring in a certain kind of expertise. The doctor knows medicine, the patient knows
his or her own life and pain. Without something like a merger of these two
viewpoints and resources, a successful consultation will not happen. While this is
well known to everybody involved, the doctor's formal status and traditional stance
tend to exclude and invalidate the patient's expertise. In challenging situations, the
familiar voice of authority will ask 'Who is the expert here?" So while lay persons
or clients represent types of expertise of their own, their contribution and
participation in expert activity is problematic and full of tensions.
The heterogeneity of expertise may be captured with the help of the notions of
dialogicality and 'multivoicedness' of human cognition (Bakhtin, 1981; Bibler,
1983/84; Markova & Foppa, 1990; Todorov, 1984; Wertsch, 1991). To put it
simply, expertise in any given field is an ongoing dialogue or polyphony of
multiple competing and complementary viewpoints and their respective
'instrumentalities', repertoires of mediational means. The various voices represent
'social languages' rooted in different societal positions, ideologies and traditions
of practice. This multivoicedness is both a resource for collective achievement
and a potential source of fragmentation and conflict.
But it is not only a question of diversification, or co-existence of competing
contemporary schools, viewpoints and positions within fields of expert
activity. There is also a historical dimension to be observed. Competing schools
of thought and viewpoints originate in different historical periods and conditions.
Old traditions persist and modify themselves. In this sense, alternative frames of
reference may be analyzed as if historical layers of expertise, to be identified by an
'archeology of expert knowledge'. Competing and contradictory historical layers
of expert thought can regularly be discovered within one and the same
organization, and often within the actions and thoughts of one and the same
individual practitioner.
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Is this diversification and historical change limited to frames of reference - or
are also cognitive procedures of expert thinking and problem solving subject
to historical change?
Shoshana Zuboff suggests that there is a pervasive historical transition taking
place in the very core of expert cognitive procedures. She argues that
traditional forms of industrial, clerical and professional work foster and
require a specific type of skills which she calls action-centered. These skills
exhibit the following characteristics (Zuboff, 1988, p. 61).
1. Sentience. Action-centered skill is based upon sentient information derived
from physical cues.
2. Action-dependence. Action-centered skill is developed in physical
performance. Although in principle it may be made explicit in language, it
typically remains unexplicated - implicit in action.
3. Context-dependence. Action-centered skill only has meaning within the
context in which its associated physical activities can occur.
4. Personalism. It is the individual body that takes in the situation and an
individual's actions that display the required competence. There is a felt
linkage between the knower and the known. The implicit quality of knowledge
provides it with a sense of interiority, much like physical experience.
According to Zuboff, computerization of work brings about a crisis in action-
centered skills and an emergence of a new type of intellective skills. In
intellective skills, meaning is constructed explicitly, on the basis of analyzing
symbolically mediated information, typically the electronic text.
The demands of constructing meaning from a symbolic medium diminish the salience, or even the
possibility, of a shared action context Without a context in which meanings can be assumed,
people have to articulate their own rendering of meaning and communicate it to others. Indeed,
the very activity of constructing meaning often necessitates a pooling of intellective skill in order
to achieve the most compelling interpretation of the text. (...) when people confront the electronic
text and ask the questions. What's happening? What does this mean?' the answers, whether in the
form of an interior dialogue or in a conversation with others, will be in the medium of language. (...)
The proper interpretation of data as they appear on a video screen is rarely self-evident. In my
observations, the interpretations developed by operators and managers were actively constructed in
dialogue and joint hypothesis testing." (Zuboff, 1988, p. 196-197)
In spite of its oversimplified dichotomous character, Zuboff´s account presents
a strong case for the changing nature of the cognitive skills involved in
expertise. It seems that both the frames of reference and the cognitive
procedures of experts are non-universal and historical.
EXPERTISE RESIDES IN COLLECTIVE ACTIVITY SYSTEMS
So far, I have argued for heterogeneity of expertise. This could easily be
misinterpreted as merely a plea for acknowledging individual differences in
experts' orientations. Much more is at stake, however. The fundamental
question is: Where does expertise reside?
Dominant Cartesian approaches take it for granted that expertise resides under
the individual's skin, in the form of explicit or tacit knowledge, skills and
cognitive properties that enable one to display superior performances in the
given field. Thus, performing a discrete task alone and without external aids
is seen as the proper unit of analysis. This definition contains three interrelated
aspects: (a) the object-related aspect of discrete tasks, (b) the social aspect of
loneliness, and (c) the artifact- and tool-related aspect of single-handed
performance.
The larger context of expert performance leaks into mainstream discussions
chiefly in two forms. Firstly, there is always the issue of 'external constraints'
or 'environmental constraints', such as time, amount and quality of
information  available,  and  the  like  (Lawrence,  1988).  Secondly,  there  is  the
issue of motivation (Posner, 1988). It is somewhat disturbing to realize that the
dominant traditions say practically nothing about the factors that make experts
learn and perform their discrete tasks in the first place. Attempts at an
alternative approach based on the notion of 'psychic energy' are stuck at the
same individualist level of analysis, positing the exceptional invidual "who
might have been born with an unusual sensitivity to some domain of
experience" as the locus of creative expertise (Csikszenmihalyi, 1988, p. 166).
According to Glaser and Chi (1988, p. xix), when experts face and analyze a
task, they 'add constraints to the problem'. The authors cite the study of Voss
and Post (1988) on solving ill-defined economic problems, using as an example
a problem where subjects were asked to find solutions to the low agricultural
production in what used to be the Soviet Union.
"By elaborating the initial state of the problem, the experts identified possible constraints, such as
Soviet ideology and the amount of arable land. (Adding constraints, in effect, reduced the search
space. For example, (...) considering the constraint of the Soviet ideology precluded the solution of
fostering private competition - a capitalistic solution.)" (Glaser & Chi, 1988, p. xix-xx)
Reducing the search space - or reducing the context of thinking - seems to
work fine in stable conditions where tasks are standardized and problems have
constant 'correct solutions'. In the case of Soviet agriculture, the 'ideological
constraint' so confidently added by the experts has recently evaporated in rapid
societal transformation. In other words, in changing and unpredictable
conditions, narrowing down the search space may actually lead to a cognitive
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contraints are taken for granted and reinforced. Charles Perrow (1984) analyzes
a series of cases where unexpected and intertwined multiple failures in complex
technological systems were met with narrowing down the search space by the
experts - with catastrophic results, like in the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.
Jay Katz adds an important observation from medicine.
"Specialization tends to narrow diagnostic vision and to foster beliefs in the superior
effectiveness of treatments prescribed by one's own specialty. This effect of specialization is
reflected in the contemporary treatment of most diseases." (Katz, 1984, p. 188)
In novel situations of uncertainty, the lonely, unaided and narrowly task-oriented
expert appears helpless and sometimes dangerous. Non-standard problems and
disturbances seem to be outside his or her field of control. The unit of analysis
adopted by the dominant approaches to expertise supports and reproduces this
helplessness.
Drawing on the cultural-historical theory of activity initiated by Vygotsky (1978)
and Leont'ev (1978; 1981), I will use the mediated activity system as my basic
unit of analysis. The notion of mediation is crucial here. An activity system
comprises the individual practitioner, the colleagues and co-workers of the
workplace community, the conceptual and practical tools, and the shared objects as a
unified dynamic whole. A model of an activity system is presented in Figure 1.1.
The model reveals the decisive feature of multiple mediations in activity. The
subject and the object, or the actor and the environment, are mediated by
instruments, including symbols and representations of various kinds. This,
however, is but 'the tip of an iceberg', depicted as the uppermost sub-triangle of
Figure 1.1. The less visible social mediators of activity - rules, community, and
division of labor - are depicted at the bottom of the model. Between the
components of the system, there are continuous transformations. The activity system
incessantly reconstructs itself.
An activity system is much more competent and robust than any of its
individual expert members. Similar views of work, cognition and expertise as
artifact-mediated, socially distributed activity have recently been discussed by
Bodker & Gronbaek (in press), Bowers & Middleton (1991), Goodwin &
Goodwin (in press), Hutchins (1990), Hutchins & Klausen (in press), Raeithel (in
press). Star (in press), Suchman (in press), and others, although usually without
explicating the generic structure of activity in such detail as in Figure 1.1 above.
Howard Becker's (1982; 1986) sociological ideas are also close to my approach.
An activity system does, not exist in a vacuum. It is but a node in a multi-
dimensional network of activity systems (Figure 1.2). Its relevant 'neighbour
activities' include firstly the activities where the objects and outcomes of the central
activity are embedded (let's call them object-activities). Secondly, they include the
activities that produce the key instruments for the central activity (instrument-
producing activities). Thirdly, they include activities like education and
schooling of the subjects of the central activity (subject-producing activities).
Fourthly, they include activities like administration and legislation (rule-producing
activities). Fifthly, they include activity systems essentially similar to the central
activity. Some of those are regarded as in some respects more advanced than the
central activity. These and other activities which are in some way, for a longer or
shorter period, connected to the given central activity, potentially destabilize each
other through their exchanges and inter-penetrations.
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EXP ERTIS E IS LEARNING WH AT I S NO T YET TH ERE
Within dominant Cartesian approaches, expert learning is uniformly described in the form
of the famous continuum from novice to expert. Apprenticeship-like gathering of practical
experience under the guidance of masters is offered as the basic form of acquiring
expertise. Chase and Simon (1973, p. 279) summarize this view in their study of chess
masters.
The organization of the Master's elaborate repertoire of information takes thousands of
hours to build up, and the same is true of any skilled task (e.g., football, music). That is
why practice is the major independent variable in the acquisition of skill."
Ericsson and Smith (1991) point out that ten or more years of full-time practice are
required to attain an 'international level of performance' in a variety of skills, such as
chess, music, or professional sports.
This enthusiastic belief in the blessings of extensive practical experience may be
contrasted with John Dewey's (1910, p. 148) remarks on the dark side of experience.
"Mental inertia, laziness, unjustifiable conservatism, are its probable accompaniments. Its
general effect upon mental attitude is more serious than even the specific wrong
conclusions in which it has landed. Wherever the chief dependence in forming inferences
is upon the conjunctions observed in past experience, failures to agree with the usual
order are slurred over, cases of successful confirmation are exaggerated. Since the mind
naturally demands some principle of continuity, some connecting link between separate
facts and causes, forces are arbitrarily invented for that purpose."
A contemporary version of these observations is crystallized in the notion of 'skilled
incompetence', offered by Chris Argyris (1986; 1991).
"Put simply, because many professionals are almost always successful at what they do,
they rarely experience failure. And because they have rarely failed, they have never
learned how to learn from failure. So whenever their single-loop learning strategies go
wrong, they become defensive, screen out criticism, and put the blame' on anyone and
everyone but themselves. In short, their ability to learnshuts down precisely at the
moment they need it the most." (Argyris, 1991. p. 100)
This troublesome observation leaks into mainstream discussion through the findings of
research in behavioral decision theory.
"In many studies, experts do not perform impressively at all. For example, many expert
judges fail to do significantly better than novices who, at best, have slight familiarity with
the task at hand." (Johnson, 1988, p. 209; see also Brehmer, 1980)
The studies Johnson refers to deal with probabilistic judgment and decision-
making under uncertainty. There is also evidence that novices may be superior to
experts in dealing with sudden changes in the task (Hendrick, 1983). Our own
research on novice and expert janitorial cleaners (Engestrom &
Engeström, 1986) suggests that established mastery is questionable yet in
another respect. The novice cleaners performed better than expert cleaners in
tasks requiring reasoning about the goals and systemic features of the entire
work activity and its organization. The experts outperformed the novices in
discrete routine tasks.
The dominant Cartesian approaches reproduce the conservatism of experience-
based expertise by sticking to the consensus criterion of expert solutions:
"generally, a solution is regarded as good if other solvers find little wrong with it
and think it will work" (Voss & Post, 1988, p. 281). This stance effectively rules
out novel, unorthodox, and therefore suspect solutions.
Dewey was not satisfied with pointing out the dark side of experience. He was
keenly aware of the double-edged, internally contradictory nature of practical
experience.
"In short, the term experience may be interpreted either with reference to the empirical or
the experimental attitude of mind. Experience is not a rigid and closed thing; it is vital,
and hence growing. When dominated by the past, the custom and routine, it is often
opposed to the reasonable, the thoughtful. But experience also includes the reflection that
sets us free from the limiting influence of sense, appetite, and tradition." (Dewey, 1910, p.
156)
Phrased differently, we need to distinguish between internalization of the
culturally given and externalization of novel ideas, artifacts, and patterns of
interaction. Both belong to experience and practice • when practice is understood
as meaningful collective activity, or praxis, not only as individual rehearsing of
discrete skills.
People do become good at various tasks and in various domains by gradually
internalizing already invented knowledge and procedures. But this is only half of
the story. World chess champion Garri Kasparov has certainly spent thousands of
hours studying various past games, their positions and best moves. But while he
internalized the culture of chess, he also contributed to its dramatic trans-
formation. He not only internalized the existing wisdom, he also questioned it
and created entirely new chess culture. He was a rebel and threat in the orthodox
Soviet chess world. His ideas and actions gained momentum and were
materialized into novel patterns of collective praxis. These parallel processes of
internalization and externalization may be schematically depicted with the help
of Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3: The parallel processes of internalization and externalization
In Figure 1.3, a developmental cycle of expert activity begins with almost
exclusive emphasis on internalization, on socializing and training the novices to
become competent members of the activity as it is routinely carried out.
Creative externalization occurs first in the form of discrete individual
deviations and innovations. As the disruptions and contradictions of the activity
become more demanding, internalization takes increasingly the form of critical self-
reflection, and externalization, search for novel solutions, increases.
Externalization reaches its peak when a new model for the activity is
envisioned, designed and implemented. As the new model becomes
consolidated, internalization of its inherent ways and means again becomes the
dominant form of learning and development.
At the level of collective activity systems, such a developmental cycle may be
seen as the equivalent of the zone of proximal development, discussed by
Vygotsky (1978) at the level of individual learning. A key feature of
developmental cycles is that they are definitely not predetermined courses of one-
dimensional development. What is more advanced, 'which way is up', cannot be
decided using externally given fixed yardsticks. Those decisions are made locally,
within the expansive cycles themselves, under conditions of uncertainty and
intensive search. Yet they are not arbitrary decisions. The internal contradictions of
the given activity system in a given phase of its evolution can be more or less
adequately identified, and any model for future
which does not address and solve those contradictions will eventually turn out to be
non-viable.
As I pointed out above, an activity system is by definition a multi-voiced
formation. A developmental cycle is a re-orchestration of those voices, of the
different viewpoints and approaches of the various participants. Historicity in this
perspective means identifying the past cycles of the activity system. The re-
orchestration of the multiple voices may be dramatically facilitated when the
different voices are seen against their historical background, as layers or segments
in a pool of complementary competencies within an activity system.
Most research and theorizing on learning has focused exclusively on
internalization of the given. However, mastery of qualitative transformations and
reorganizations of work activities has become the true challenge to expertise in
practice.
Against this background, the crucial learning in expert activity systems is learning
what is not yet there. This the famous issue of bootstrapping in human learning and
development (Bereiter, 1985), now seen in a collective scale. An activity system
deeply involved in its inner contradictions will not find relief by looking for
established masters who could tell the practitioners what model to adopt for the
future. There are no such masters. When this is realized, learning becomes a
question of joint creation of a zone of proximal development for the activity
system. The needed new model must be internalized in the very process of
generating and externalizing it. In other words, learning becomes a venture of
designing, implementing and mastering the next developmental stage of the activity
system  itself.  A  similar  view  of  learning  as  'progressive  problem  solving'  and
'working at the edge of one's competence' has recently been suggested by Bereiter
and Scardamalia (in press), although still limited to the level of an individual
subject.
In this framework learning becomes above all a question of generating a model for the
future activity as well as the associated conceptual and practical tools, organizational
patterns, and rules. In other words, learning becomes a venture of designing,
implementing and internalizing the next developmental stage of the activity system
itself.
There are important intermediate phases in a developmental cycle of an activity
system. The activity system moves from 'business as usual' to an unarticulated
'need state' and then to a stage of increasingly aggravated inner tensions (double bind;
see Bateson & al., 1972) which eventually threaten the very continuity of the
activity. Parallel to the failures, conflicts and tensions, there are individual
innovative attempts to overcome the limitations of the present organization. At
some point, efforts are made to analyze the situation, which often further sharpens
the  double  bind.  In  the  midst  of  regressive  and evasive  attempts,  there  emerges  a
novel 'germ cell' idea for the reorganization
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of the activity in order to solve its aggravated inner contradictions. This idea gains
momentum  and  is  turned  into  a  model.  The  model  is  enriched  by  designing
corresponding tools and patterns of interaction. The new model is implemented in
practice, producing new conflicts between designed new ways and customary old
ways of working. By working through these conflicts, the designed or given new
model is replaced by the created new model, firmly grounded in practice.
These idealized and simplified phases of a developmental cycle are depicted in
Figure 1.4. The two-headed arrows signify the iterative, non-linear character of
the process.
The developmental cycle has an expansive character. Expansion has
several facets. First, through the expansive cycle the activity system
reconceptualizes its object and outcome, putting the in a new, wider context.
In other words, the practitioners ask what they are doing and why, not just how they
are doing it. Second, the expansive cycle starts out with a few individuals acting
as spearheads of change, but leads to a movement or a bandwagon that involves the
entire community and eventually affects several related activity systems (on
movements and bandwagons, see Kling & Iacono, 1988; Fujimura, 1988; Zald &
Berger, 1978). Finally expansion implies diversification of the initial model into
various applications and modifications, often substantially different from and critical
toward the initial model.
THERE ARE INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS IN EXPERT
ACTIVITY SYSTEMS
Cartesian approaches to expertise are obsessed with superior performances and
extraordinary skills. They are also obsessed with the stability of such
performances and skills (Ericsson & Smith, 1991).
If mastering transformations of activities is acknowledged as an increasingly crucial
characteristic of expertise, stable superior performances appear relatively
uninteresting. Failures, breakdowns and innovations become much more interesting.
For the researcher this means leaving the elitist world of superior individuals and
entering the mundane world of everyday troubles in collective settings.
Symptomatically enough, in studies of work, mistakes, disturbances, failures and
disasters have attracted the attention of researchers for quite a while. One of the
pioneers was the sociologist Everett Hughes (1951) who took up the significance of
mistakes at work. Continuing Hughes' lead, Riemer (1976) showed that many
mistakes in construction work are quite inevitable in the given structural
conditions. In medicine, there is an important body of literature on such
mistakes and failures (e.g.. Bosk, 1980; Strauss & al., 1985).
This structural or, more appropriately, contextual and cultural-historical
embeddedness of seemingly arbitrary and irrational troubles at work has
subsequently been analyzed from various viewpoints (e.g.. Turner, 1978;
Perrow, 1984; Hargrove & Glidewell, 1990; Reason, 1990). Along with
studies of major disasters, an increasing amount of research is being done on less
spectacular disturbances, misunderstandings and conflicts, particularly in work
settings requiring intensive communication between experts and clients (e.g.. West,
1984; Grimshaw, 1990; Conley & O'Barr, 1990; Coupland, Giles & Wiemann,
1991).
In everyday troubles, one should distinguish between open discoordinations or
disturbances of interaction, latent or hidden ruptures of intersubjective
understanding, and dilemmas within thought and discourse. In addition, there are
innovations, situations and action sequences where actors attempt to go beyond the
standard precedure in order to achieve something more than the routine outcome.
By discoordinations or disturbances I mean deviations from the normal scripted
course of events in the work process, normal being defined by plans, explicit rules,
or tacitly assumed traditions. A discoordination may occur between two or more
people, or between people and artifacts, or between people, artifacts and natural
conditions. A discoordination takes the form of an obstacle, difficulty, failure or
conflict (for a striking example of such discoordinations, see Whalen, Zimmerman
& Whalen. 1988).
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By ruptures I mean blocks, breaks or gaps in the intersubjective understanding and
flow of information between two or more participants of the the activity. Ruptures
don't ostensibly disturb the flow of the work process, although they may lead to
actual discoordinations or mistakes. Ruptures are thus found by interviewing and
observing the participants 'off line', outside or after the 'online' interaction.
Dilemmas in the discourse and thought of individuals and collectives have been
analyzed by Billig and his collaborators (Billig, 1987; Billig & al., 1988). The
authors point out the importance of hedges, reservations, qualifications and
hesitations as symptoms of deeper dilemmas.
The presence of contrary themes in discussions is revealed by the use of qualifications. The
unqualified expression of one theme sems to call forth a counter-qualification in the name of the
opposing theme. There is a tension in the discourse, which can make even monologue take the form
of argumentation and argument occur, even when all participants share similar contrary themes. (...)
The dilemmatic aspects do not only concern contrary ways of talking about the world; they exist in
practice as well as in discourse. Above all, the dilemmatic aspects can give rise to actual dilemmas in
which choices have to be made." (Billig & al., 1988, p. 144)
To account for the generation of everyday failures and innovations, I must return
to  the  notion  of  activity  system as  the  unit  of  analysis.  As  I  showed above,  an
activity system does not exist in a vacuum. It interacts with a network of other
activity systems. For example, it receives rules and instruments from certain
activity systems (e.g., management), and produces outcomes for certain other
activity systems (e.g., clients). Thus, influences from outside 'intrude' into the
activity systems. However, such external forces are not a sufficient explanation for
surprising events and changes in the activity. Direct mechanical causation
cannot be identified. The outside influences are first appropriated by the activity
system, turned and modified into internal factors. Actual causation occurs as the
alien element becomes internal to the activity. This happens in the form of
imbalance and tension. The activity system is constantly working through tensions
and contradictions within and between its elements. In this sense, an activity system
is a virtual disturbance- and innovation-producing machine.
The primary contradiction of activities in capitalist socio-economic formations lives
as the inner conflict between exchange value and use value within each element of
the triangle of activity. A hypothetical work activity of general practitioners in
primary medical care may serve as an illustration. The primary contradiction, the
dual nature of use value and exchange value, can be found by focusing on any of the
elements of the doctor's work activity. For example, instruments of this work
include a tremendous variety of medicaments and drugs. But they are not just
useful preparations for healing -they are above all commodities with prices,
manufactured for a market.
advertised and sold for profit. Every doctor faces this contradiction in his daily
decision making, in one form or another.
The secondary contradictions are those appearing between the elements. The stiff
hierarchical division of labor lagging behind and preventing the possibilities
opened by advanced instruments is a typical example. A typical secondary
contradiction in this work activity would be the conflict between the traditional
biomedical conceptual instruments concerning the classification of diseases and
correct diagnosis on the one hand and the changing nature of the objects, namely
the increasingly ambivalent and complex problems and symptoms of the patients.
These problems more and more often do not comply with the standards of classical
diagnosis and nomenclature. They require an integrated social, psychological and
biomedical approach which may not yet exist.
The tertiary contradiction appears when representatives of culture (e.g., teachers)
introduce the object and motive of a culturally more advanced form of the central
activity into the dominant form of the central activity. For example, the primary
school pupil goes to school in order to play with his mates (the dominant motive),
but the parents and the teacher try to make him study seriously (the culturally more
advanced motive). The culturally more advanced object and motive may also be
actively sought by the subjects of the central activity themselves. A tertiary
contradiction arises when, say, the administrators of the medical care system order
the practitioners to employ certain new procedures corresponding to the ideals of a
more wholistic and integrated medicine. The new procedures may be formally
implemented, but probably still subordinated to and resisted by the old general
form of the activity.
The quaternary contradictions require that we take into consideration the essential
'neighbour activities' linked with the central activity which is the original object of
our study. Quaternary contradictions are those that emerge between the central
activity and the neighbouring activity in their interaction. Conflicts and resistances
appearing in the course of the 'implementation' of the outcomes of the central
activity in the system of the object-activity are a case in point. Suppose that a
doctor, working on such a new wholistic and integrated basis, orders or suggests
that the patient shall accept a new habit or conception and change his way of life in
some respect The patient may react with resistance. This is an instance of the
quaternary contradictions. The patient's way of life or his "health behavior' is
here the object-activity. If patients are regarded as abstract symptoms and diseases,
isolated from their activity contexts, it will be impossible to grasp the
developmental dynamics of the central activity, too.
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The four levels of contradictions may now be placed in appropriate locations
in the schematic network of activities presented earlier in this chapter (Figure
new universal norm. If the new norm did not originally appear in this exact manner, it would never
become a really universal form, but would exist merely in fantasy, in wishful thinking." (Ilyenkov,
1982, p. 83-84)
Figure 1.5: Four levels of contradictions in a simplified network of human
activity systems
Level 1: Primary inner contradiction (double nature) within each constituent component of the
central activity.
Level 2: Secondary contradictions between the constituents of the central activity.
Level 3: Tertiary contradiction between the object/motive of the dominant form of the central
activity and the object/motive of a culturally more advanced form of the central activity.
Level 4: Quaternary contradictions between the central activity and its neighbour activities.
Contradictions are not just inevitable features of activity. They are "the
principle of its self-movement and (...) the form in which the development is
cast" (Ilyenkov, 1977, 330). This means that new qualitative stages and forms
of activity emerge as solutions to the contradictions of the preceding stage of
form. This in turn takes place in the form of "invisible breakthroughs'.
"In reality it always happens that a phenomenon which later becomes universal originally
emerges as an individual, particular, specific phenomenon, as an exception from the rule. It cannot
actually emerge in any other way. Otherwise history would have a rather mysterious form.
Thus, any new improvement of labour, every new mode of man's action in production, before
becoming generally accepted and recognised, first emerge as a certain deviation from previously
accepted and codified norms. Having emerged as an individual exception from the rule in the labour
of one or several men, the new form is then taken over by others, becoming in time a
EXPERT    ACTIVITY    SYSTEMS    ARE     IN    HISTORICAL
TRANSITION
In recent years, there has been an intensive discussion on the alleged crisis or
breakdown of so called Fordist forms of mass production and on the
emergence of post-Fordist modes of flexible specialization. Without entering
this  debate  in  any depth,  one  can  safely  observe  that  teams and networks  are
gaining increasing importance as forms of organizing work. The success of the
Japanese economy is often associated with those forms. In core industries such
as automobile factories round the world, the 'team concept' is being adopted
and experimented with (MacDuffie & Krafcik, 1989; Womack, Jones & Roos,
1990). In vital services such as health care and social work, multiprofessional
teams proliferate (Callicutt & Lecca, 1983; Lecca & McNeil, 1985a; Pritchard
& Pritchard, 1992). Management teams and networks are becoming a central
feature of both private corporations and public organizations. There is an
abundance of enthusiastic literature advocating the virtues of teams and
networks (e.g., Charan, 1991; Hackman, 1990; Heany, 1989).
However, teams are also problematic. Peter Senge (1990, p. 24) characterizes
the situation as follows.
"All too often, teams in business tend to spend their time fighting for turf, avoiding anything that
will make them look bad personally, and pretending that everyone is behind the team's collective
strategy - maintaining the appearance of a cohesive team. To keep up the image, they seek to squelch
disagreement; people with serious reservations avoid stating them publicly, and joint decisions are
watered-down compromises reflecting what everyone can live with, or else reflecting one person's
view foisted on the group. If there is disagreement, it's usually expressed in a manner that lays
blame, polarizes opinion, and fails to reveal the underlying differences in assumptions and
experience in a way that the team as a whole could learn."
Ancona (1991, p. 1) points out the same dilemma.
"The increased use of teams is a two-edged sword. The rhetoric in the popular press often
stresses the positive side. Teams are seen as the key to success in Japan and as a means of
restoring American competitiveness: a mechanism to increase commitment, improve
productivity and quality, and provide flexibility in a changing environment. On the negative side,
both common lore and current research show that teams often face process losses; the whole is
less than the sum of its parts. (...) Researchers have found that new product and process
development teams intended to improve time to market are often far less effective than expectations
of foreign comparison would have predicted."
A closer look at the literature reveals sets of conflicting, even diametrically
opposite assessments and claims about the adoption of teams and networks as
frameworks for organizing work. There are three levels to this dilemma:
CULTURALLY MORE
ADVANCED CENTRAL
ACTIVITY
INSTRUMENT
PRODUCING
ACTIVITY
SUBJECT-
PRODUCING
ACTIVITY
RULE-PRODUCING
ACTIVITY
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(1) At a general level of policy formation, there are strong claims arguing for
the superior efficiency, motivational value and emancipatory implications of
teams (e.g., Rosow, 1986); at the same time, there are equally strong claims
maintaining that teams are a new mode of exploitation and control, of
'management by stress'   (e.g., Parker & Slaughter, 1988; Mumby & Stohl,
1991).
(2) At the level of interprofessional relations, there are findings and claims
that speak for teams as means of enhancing cross-professional collaboration
and flexibility; at the same time, there are findings and claims that speak of
violent turf struggles between professions in teams (e.g., Erde, 1982; Lecca &
McNeil, 1985b).
(3) Finally at the level of problem solving and learning, there are findings and
claims that speak of tremendous cognitive benefits gained in teamwork; at the
same time, there are findings and claims that warn of the danger of increased
conformism and stagnant 'groupthink' in teams (e.g., Janis, 1985).
Underneath the surface of general value-laden, often outright ideological
proclamations for and against the 'team concept', there is actually very little
concrete research on cognitive and communicative processes within and
between teams in real organizational contexts. The bulk of the available
empirical literature consists of decontextualized experimental studies on
supposedly universal psychological dynamics of small groups. These
traditional studies aim at finding laws of group behavior that are independent
of cultural and institutional specifics. Only quite recently has a new wave of
research emerged. Cognitive scientists, anthropologists and sociologists have
begun to  develop approaches  to  teams and networks  that  take  the  cultural  and
organizational context as an integral constitutive aspect of the phenomena to be
explained.
This emerging new wave of research is partly inspired by the new information
technologies that are dramatically altering the technical possibilities of
intellectual collaboration in work (e.g., Galegher, Kraut & Egido, 1990;
Greenbaum & Kyng, 1991; Greif, 1988). On the other hand, the new wave is
inspired by a number of related theoretical and methodological approaches
(Lave & Wenger, 1991; Resnick, Levine & Teasley, 1991). These include
symbolic interactionism, distributed artificial intelligence, ethnomethodology,
discourse analysis, and the cultural-historical theory of activity (for a
comparative discussion, see Star, in press). These different approaches find
common ground in discussions of culturally situated, socially distributed and
artifact-mediated cognition in 'communities of practice' (e.g., Engeström &
Middleton, in press).
It is vitally important that the rigorous micro level analyses launched by the
new wave characterized above be brought into contact with macro level
economic and sociological interpretations of the current transformations in
work and organizations (e.g., Cole, 1989). In concrete research, teams and
networks have surfaced time and again as transitional forms, representing
something in the 'grey area' between dominant rationalized work organization
and emerging, historically new organizational patterns. This general historical
hypothesis may be schematically depicted as follows (Figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6: Fields of historical transition in expertise
In Figure 1.6, field number one represents the historically oldest currently
observable layer of work and expertise: craft. Fields two and three represent
the two alternative main directions of rationalizing work: hierarchy and
market, or bureaucracy and enterpreneurship, respectively. Field four
represents team and network -based organization of work and expertise. This
field is "neither market nor hierarchy", as Powell (1990) succinctly put it (see
also Thorelli, 1986). The grey zone represents historical movement from craft
to the three other organizational modes, along the lines of increasing flexibility
on the one hand and increasing collectivity on the other hand. The grey zone is
an area of constant disturbances, ruptures and innovations from below. There
is an ongoing struggle between competing organizational options. Notice that
the direct gateway from field one to field four is very narrow, indicating the
probability that team and network solutions do not usually emerge in pure
form' but rather by long 'detours' through and in mixtures with hierarchy and
market forms of organization.
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The historical hypothesis sketched in Figure 1.6 above expresses the
assumption that there are identifiable qualitative differences between the emerging
team and network-based organization on the one hand and currently predominant
hierarchy and market types of organization on the other hand. However, this does not
mean that I expect all teams and all networks to be automatically representatives of
a qualitatively new type of work organization.
According to Leont'ev (1978), the decisive differentia specified that enables us to
identify an activity system is the object to which it is directed. Accordingly,
historical types of activity systems should differ from each other above all in their
relationship to their objects. The crucial characteristic of team and network-based
work organization is therefore not the external form of interconnected work
groups but the way these groups conceive of the objects of their work. The external
forms are important preconditions and symptoms of the emergence of the new - but
not its essence.
Walter Powell argues that the rise of network organizations is indeed based on the
emergence of a new type of objects which he calls 'intangible assets.'
"Networks (...) are especially useful for the exchange of commodities whose value is not easily
measured. Such qualitative matters as know-how, technological capability, a
particular approach or style of production, a spirit of innovation or
experimentation, or a philosophy of zero defects are very hard to place a price
tag on. They are not easily traded in markets nor communicated through a
corporate hierarchy." (Powell, 1990, p. 304)
Powell's point receives support from studies on informal know-how trading
between competitors in innovative industries (von Hippel, 1987). The Japanese
models of producing innovations by means of intricate networks represent a more
deliberate approach to the same potentials (Imai, Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1985).
Deborah Ancona's recent studies suggest how teams may formulate a new,
expanded conception of the objects of their work. Ancona (1991) found three
different strategies teams developed toward their environment: informing,
parading, and probing. The informing team had a primary goal of creating an
enthusiastic team with open communication among members - but with a low level
of interaction with clients. The parading teams wanted to obtain visibility among
clients or within the organization. Finally the probing teams opted for high levels of
two-way communication with the external environment. They emphasized
diagnoses of the clients' needs and feedback on team ideas.
They did not use existing member knowledge alone to map their external
environment; members were encouraged to take on new perspectives and bring in
new data. These teams had the highest level of external contact, were aggressive
not only in testing potential interventions but also in actually implementing new
programs, and convinced people in both the field and top management that they
were doing a good job." (Ancona, 1991, p. 7-8)
Teams with their meetings and internal dynamics have a strong tendency of turning
inward and encapsulating themselves. In this process they often substitute their
objects in the outside world with "pseudo-objects', or layers of talk, artifacts and
'busywork' that function as blankets covering and muffling the objects. The probing
strategy confronts this tendency. Such a strategy seems to be a crucial
precondition if teams are to constitute active nodes in a network. In activity-
theoretical terms, the probing strategy aims at constant reconceptualization and
expansion of the object of activity. The object is not seen as consisting of separate
fixed tasks or items to be acted upon in a one-way manner. The object is viewed as
interconnected tasks embedded in their respective activity systems that have to be
understood and interacted with.
Teams are often characterized as vehicles for collective and innovative
learning. They are potentially units that learn by continuously going beyond the
information given.
"Autonomous groups are learning systems. As their capabilities increase, they
extend their decision space. In production units they tend to absorb certain
maintenance and control functions. They become able to set their own
machines. The problem-solving capability increases on day-to-day issues. They
negotiate for their special needs with their supply and user departments. As time
goes on, more of their members acquire more of the relevant skills. Yet most
such groups allow a considerable range of preferences as regards multi-skilling
and job interchange." (Trist, 1981, p. 34)
Networks are described in a similar vein.
"One of the key advantages of network arrangements is their ability to disseminate
and interpret new information. Networks are based on complex communication
channels. (...) they are particularly adept at generating new interpretations; as a
result of these new accounts, novel linkages are often formed. This advantage is
seen most clearly when networks are contrasted with markets and hierarchies.
Passing information up or down a corporate hierarchy or purchasing
information in the marketplace is merely a way of processing information or
acquiring a commodity. In either case the flow of information is controlled. No
new meanings or interpretations are generated. In contrast, networks provide a
context for learning by doing. As information passes through a network, it is both
freer and richer, new connections and new meanings are generated, debated, and
evaluated." (Powell, 1990, p. 325)
These characterizations seem to be overly simplified. Ancona points out that the
three strategies she found in teams imply qualitatively different modes of learning.
"Informing is similar to learning about the outside world through contemplation; if
you leave us alone to think and discuss, we will tell you what you need when
we have figured it out. Parading is similar to learning through observation. The
message here is that we want to watch you, to understand you, and to let you
know that we are around to respond to your needs. Finally, probing (...) occurs
through experimentation, trying out a new idea and seeing the reaction, making
an intervention and evaluating the result" (Ancona, 1991, p. 9)
While useful, Ancona's categories are still rather metaphorical. In analyses of work
and learning, a crucial theoretical question is how to combine the
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subject-object and the subject-subject, or the instrumental and the
communicative, aspects of the activity.
The vision of current transformation in expert activities presented above can
best be concretized and tested by means of detailed analyses of team and
network activities in various local work settings and cultural contexts. It is a
task for concrete research to find out what kinds of novel learning processes
actually emerge in different teams and potential network settings, and how
such novel forms may inform the development of education and training. In
the following three chapters, three such empirical case studies are presented.
The first two studies (chapters 2 and 3) deal with legal expertise in American
and Finnish court settings. The third study (chapter 4) deals with medical
expertise in primary health care settings in Finland.
2. THE TENSIONS OF JUDGING: HANDLING
CASES OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL IN FINLAND AND CALIFORNIA1
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I will analyze legal work conducted in municipal courts, taking
the work and expertise of the judge as my point of departure. I will use data
from two different cultural settings: a municipal court in a mid-sized city in
Finland, and a municipal court in a large city in southern California. I will
restrict my analysis to the handling of cases of driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUIA, or DUI for short). In both cultures, these are considered
common, simple and routine cases.
There is, however, a marked difference in the general attitudes toward
drunken driving in these two cultures. In California, drunken driving is
defined as a misdemeanor, and in legal practice it  is not regarded as a serious
offense. As Gusfield (1981, p. 140) observes, "in day-to-day enforcement and
adjudication DUIA is treated as if, like other traffic offenses, it is the normal
behavior of motorists." In Finland, drunken driving is a crime, quite clearly
distinguished from other traffic violations in legal practice. In both cultures
there is political pressure toward introducing tougher laws. However, as Ross
(1991, p. 157; see also Ross, 1989) points out, "contrary to North America,
temperance movement and worry about the alcohol problem are a significant
political force in Finland." (For extended analyses of DUI as a social and
criminological phenomenon in the American society, see Gusfield, 1981;
Jacobs, 1989).
Courts are intimately connected to our notions of power. Judges are almost
emblems of ultimate secular authority. Several authors have studied how
professional experts, such as judges, may effectively suppress the concerns and
dialects of their lay clients. Such analyses of the asymmetrical power relations
between professionals and their clients (e.g., O'Barr, 1982; Harris, 1989)
illuminate an important aspect of interaction in courts. However, such
analyses do not focus on the work of the experts themselves. Far from being
straightforward exercise of power, the work of judges is internally multi-
faceted and contradictory. In this paper, I will focus on the multiple dialects,
disturbances and tensions in the work of judges, interpreting those features as
dynamic possibilities of learning, change and development.
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The data for this paper were collected in 1990. The data from Finland are from a
case example taken from a large database consisting of complete sets of official case
documents, videotaped court hearings, and audiotaped interviews of the judge and
other relevant participants in a number of different criminal and civil cases from two
municipal courts located in mid-sized cities. The data from southern California
consist of audiotaped court hearings and complementary field notes as well as
audiotaped interviews with the judge and a team of public defenders. The case
analyzed in this paper is one chosen from 53 DUI cases, the hearings of which we
recorded during one week in the court. In both settings, my research teams spent a
considerable amount of time in the field, getting acquainted with the local officials
and customs. While the analyses reported in this paper are limited exploratory case
studies, they are also part of ongoing interaction with the courts in question.
JUDGES - REFEREES, INQUISITORS, OR MORE?
Susan Philips (1990) has recently pointed out that in much of the social-scientific
literature on courts, the American trial judge is either invisible or cast in the role
of a rather passive referee who assures that procedural law is followed. This
corresponds to the notion that there are two basic types of legal procedures: the
Anglo-American 'adversarial' system and continental European 'inquisitorial'
system. According to that notion, continental European judges question
witnesses from each side of the case and are generally much more active and
dominant in the hearing than their American counterparts.
Philips herself challenges such a dichotomy and provides evidence of
American trial court judges taking more active and versatile roles than the standard
referee notion would predict (Philips, 1990; see also Yngvesson & Mather, 1983).
While I endorse this argument, I would like to inquire further into the contents,
characteristics and contextual prerequisites of such versatility in the judge's work.
Hogarth (1971) and others (e.g., Gibson, 1978; KcKnight, 1981) have shown that
there are important substantive differences in judges' 'penal philosophies' and 'role
orientations' within one and the same culture. On the other hand, Philips' (1990, p.
208) observes that "a single third-party intervenor may employ the strategies of
more than one [...] kind of remedy agent, depending on the situation." In other
words, one approach (Hogarth and others) has identified a variety of relatively
discrete philosophies or viewpoints among judges, while the other approach
(Philips) contributes the idea of multiple parallel roles used by one expert. When
these ideas are brought together, we get a picture of the judge employing several
complementary but possibly also contradictory substantive strategies or orientations
in managing the complex trajectory of a court case.
The notion of voices (e.g., Silverman & Torode, 1980; Mishler, 1984;
Wertsch, 1990) is particularly suited for the analysis of varieties of talk in
organizations, reflecting various underlying normative orders and social positions.
Conley and O'Barr (1990) have recently used the notion of voices in their analysis
of discourse in informal courts. According to them, most voices are eventually
silenced in the legal process and "the purported voice of legal authority is in fact
the voice of social power (Conley & O'Barr, 1990, p. 170)." Conley and O'Barr
found, however, that within the voice of legal authority, judges differ in their
orientations. They identified five orientations: (1) the strict adherent to the law, (2)
the law maker, (3) the mediator, (4) the authoritative decision maker, and (5) the
proceduralist.  The  orientations  manifest  themselves  in  talk.  In  this  paper,  such
qualitatively different ways of talking within the voice of legal authority will be
called dialects.
Conley and O'Barr point out that there is considerable discord in informal courts.
They mention several sources of discord, all associated with the litigants'
expectations that the court cannot meet. These discordances are described as
dissonances between the ideologies of the litigant and the judge. While such
dissonances may certainly be seen in the data of Conley and O'Barr, this may
be an unnecessarily restricted account of the nature of discord in courts. In most
courts there are multiple parties and participants whose complex interactions may
give rise to various kinds of communicative glitches, errors, breakdowns, and
conflicts. In this paper, all such deviations from the formally expected smooth script
of the court procedure will be called disturbances.
Complexity is here the key issue. Heydebrand and Seron (1990; see also Seron,
1990) present a compelling account of the rationalization of American courts in the
20th century as a response to the tension between growing caseloads and shrinking
resources. According to Seron, the dominant developmental trend in courts has been
"from traditional-professional case processing with the focus on adjudication to
technocratic case processing with the focus on administration (Seron, 1990, p.
462)." This has important implications for the judge's work. First, the traditional
division between judicial and nonjudicial, professional and clerical labor is giving
way to a new, emergent organizational model that relies on teamwork between
judge, magistrate and law clerk. Secondly, judges are increasingly urged and trained
to "think of the court as an organizational and coordinated 'system' in which they are
encouraged to take a proactive posture toward pretrial and to encourage and raise
settlement when appropriate (Seron, 1990, p. 462)."
What kinds of effects will the development described by Heydebrand and Seron
have on the nature of the judge's expertise? It may be hypothesized that the more
intricate the division of labor in the processing of a court case, the more likely it
is that the judge will have to employ and combine various
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parallel dialects and the greater the likelihood of numerous systemic
disturbances requiring repair and proactive measures from the judge. The
present study is an inquiry into these two issues.
THE COURTS AS ADMINISTRATIVE AND PHYSICAL
SYSTEMS
The two municipal courts from which I take my examples are quite different
administratively and physically. The following description is necessarily
sketchy and greatly simplified.
The court located in Finland (hereafter referred to as the Finnish court)
employs 16 judges. The court is divided into eight departments of which all
but two handle both civil and criminal cases. Different types of cases have
different combinations of judicial personnel handling them, all the way up to
the 'full composition' of three judges. Driving under the influence of alcohol is
a routine criminal case, handled in this court by one judge and a clerk,
occasionally also by a judge intem (a law school graduate acquiring his or her
judge's qualification by serving an internship in a court). Only a year earlier
DUI cases were still handled by the full composition of three judges. After we
collected our data, the rationalization has proceeded further and all routine
criminal cases not requiring the full composition are now handled by one
department only.
In simple cases such as DUI, the judge commonly dictates and compiles the
court minutes while he or she conducts the hearing; the clerk may keep notes
but those are usually only supporting material. The judge uses the original
police report in which the defendant's story (along with the arresting officer's
account) is recorded in a narrative form as a key component of the minutes.
The prosecutor's complaint,also in a free narrative form although more
condensed and formal, is another key component of the minutes.
The court has no jury institution in the American sense. In certain types of
cases  (not  in  DUI  cases),  lay  members  participate  in  the  hearing,  but  in
practice they have little input in the actual decision-making. Also it is quite
common that in simple cases such as DUI, the defendant uses no defense
attorney but represents him- or herself. There is a system of municipal public
defenders, and the court may grant a free trial to a person with limited
financial means. There is no plea bargaining in Finnish courts.
The Finnish penal code differentiates between DUI cases involving driving
under the influence and those involving severe or gross driving under the
influence. The lower limits of punishable blood alcohol level are .05 and .15
percent, respectively. The judges use a simple unofficial table to standardize
the sentences. According to the table, when the blood alcohol level is between
.05 and .10 percent, the sentence will be 20 to 30 daily fines and four to seven
months suspension of the driver's licence. When the blood alcohol level is
between .10 and .149, the sentence will be 30 to 50 daily fines and five to eight
months suspension of the driver's licence. The amount of the daily fine is
determined progressively, on the basis of the defendant's taxable monthly
income. In 1989, the court gave verdicts in 290 cases of driving under the
influence and 333 cases of severe driving under the influence. The caseload of
the court is not excessive. There is an atmosphere of relative tranquility,
tradition and stability.
The layout of the Finnish courtroom used in the DUI hearing analyzed in this
paper is depicted in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The physical layout of the Finnish courtroom
The first noticeable feature in Figure 2.1 is that there are only five people in
the  courtroom.  As  is  usual  in  these  cases,  the  defendant  used  no  defense
attorney. There is no audience. In the back of the room, there are empty seats
that could be used by spectators, but in a regular DUI case there are very
seldom any. The authority of the court is not very strongly emphasized by the
physical setup. Each participant, including the defendant, sits at a desk. The
defendant also answers questions sitting down. The judge's bench is somewhat
higher and more massive than the other desks and there is a large open Bible
on a stand attached to the front of the bench (it  is used when witnesses give
their oaths; nobody touched it in this hearing). On each desk, there is a fixed
microphone, for the purpose of taperecording the hearings. The judge wears
no special outfit.  In this case, the judge was a male, wearing a regular gray
suit. The judge intern, also male, wore a sweater and a tie.
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The court located in southern California (hereafter referred to as the
California court) is a separate part of the municipal court, called Traffic
Arraignment Court. It is located in a different part of the city than the main
municipal court building. It is the court that handles exclusively traffic
misdemeanors; felonies are automatically relegated to the next level, called
Felony Arraignment Court.
Each of the 26 judges employed by the municipal court has to complete a
'tour' fairly early in his or her career as judge. The 'tour' consists of two
months in Traffic Arraignments, then two months in Misdemeanor
Arraignments, and finally another two months in Felony Arraignments. The
same single judge handles all the cases in the given arraignment court during
the 'tour'. This way, the large bulk of routine cases are delegated exclusively
to only a few judges at a time, relieving the rest of the judges to work on more
demanding criminal and civil cases.
In  the  Traffic  Arraignment  Court,  four  or  five  main  types  of  cases  are
handled: reckless driving, speeding, failures to appear, driving on a suspended
or revoked licence, and driving under the influence. DUI cases are the most
serious ones handled in that court. Every weekday, the morning session of the
court is dedicated to the less serious cases and the afternoon session mainly to
DUI cases. It is common that 20 to 40 DUI cases are heard and decided, or else
sent forward to trial setting during one afternoon session, lasting roughly two
and half hours. The task of the arraignment court is to ensure speedy
sentencing,  given that  the  majority  of  the  defendants  enter  a  guilty  plea.  In
other words, this court functions as a filter and buffer, preventing an overflow
of cases into full-scale jury trials. Roughly 10 percent of the DUI defendants
plead not guilty and are automatically sent to trial setting. But around 90
percent are actually sentenced in the Traffic Arraignment Court.
The Traffic Arraignment Court does not have a jury; the defendants pleading
guilty waive their right to a jury trial. In principle, the judge alone makes the
decisions. However, the system is dependent on the effective functioning of a
plea bargaining machinery. The prosecutors (Deputy City Attorneys) fill out
an offer form for each defendant. The large majority of the defendants are
counseled by public defenders in cubicles in the hall outside the courtroom.
The defendant and the counseling public defender go through the offer and fill
out a plea form if the defendant pleads guilty or no contest (the latter meaning
guilty but implying that the plea cannot be used in any future civil trial
concerning the same incident). They also go through and sign a form
acknowledging the advisal of the defendant's constitutional rights. Some,
actually very few, defendants hire a private lawyer to represent them. Some,
even fewer, choose to represent themselves. The plea bargaining process
involves more counseling between the defendant and the public defender than
interaction between the public defender and the prosecutor. The latter occurs,
too, but only occasionally, when misunderstandings or disagreements surface.
The court is obviously under pressure due to the large caseload. A complex
division  of  labor  between  the  judge,  the  prosecutors,  the  public  defenders,  the
clerks, the bailiffs, and the interpreters has been erected to cope with this
pressure. In the hearing, the judge relies on a case file containing the
prosecutor's complaint and the forms filled out by the defendant and the public
defender. In order to prevent the case from being reopened due to
technicalities (which would mean additional pressure), the judge must make
sure that all the forms are correctly and completely filled out. The judge does
not keep and formulate the court minutes; that is the task of the clerk. And the
minutes are not a narrative that would need much writing or dictating. Instead,
the clerk fills out a rather detailed form, titled Misdemeanor Docket -
Judgment/Traffic, in which there is a blank for every possible element of the
sentence. Contrary to the Finnish practice, the police report describing the
actual incident in a narrative form never enters the hearing. It remains a
background document on which the prosecutor based the complaint and the
offer. The DUI complaint is a fixed form in which the prosecutor fills in the
blanks.
The sentences given to DUI offenders are standardized much as they are in the
Finnish court. The legal maximum blood alcohol level is .08 percent in
California.  For  a  first  offense,  the  legal  sentence  is  180 days  in  jail,  but  the
judge regularly grants probation for five years. The mandatory conditions of
probation include a fine of $390 to $1000, completion of an alcohol or drug
treatment program, and either (a) a minimum of 48 hours in jail  or (b) a 90-
day driver's licence restriction, allowing driving only to and from work and to
and from the court-ordered treatment program. The court may enhance the
sentence if the blood alcohol level exceeds .20 percent. The dollar amount paid
for the first offense is regularly about $1000. Hardly anyone chooses the 48
hours in jail because the Department of Motor Vehicles now automatically
suspends the offender's driver's licence for four months anyway, regardless of
the contents of the court sentence.
The layout of the California courtroom is depicted in Figure 2.2. The first
striking feature of Figure 2.2 is the large number of people in the courtroom.
It is common that 40 to 50 people are present. And there is an audience, often
quite large. The audience, people sitting on the benches in the courtroom,
consists of defendants waiting for their turn, and of people accompanying the
defendants. The cases may be handled one at a time or in groups of two or
more. The judge we observed handled the cases in batches. The clerk called
three or four defendants to step to the podium at the same time, and the judge
went  through  these  three  or  four  cases  as  one  batch,  thus  speeding  up  the
procedure.
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The locus of intensive action is not limited to the courtroom as it is in the Finnish
court. In front of the courtroom entrance, public defenders counsel defendants in
small cubicles, and this goes on even while the court is in session. And the
defendants leave the courtroom usually through the door on the left, entering an
adjacent room where clerics receive fines and give out abstracts of court record, little
slips containing condensed information on the sentence and a notice of payment of
fine (the defendant needs such an abstract in order to get the Department of Motor
Vehicles to return his or her driver's licence).
Interestingly enough, the California court highlights its authority more visibly than
the Finnish court As the judge enters the room, the bailiff, wearing a uniform,
calls  everybody in  the  room to  come to  order  and stand up.  The  judge  wears  a
black robe. The judge's bench is very high; others in the room literally have to look
up to her (in the case analyzed below, the judge was a woman). The defendants
always stand up at the small podium in front of the bench when the judge discusses
their cases.
TWO DUI HEARINGS
In the following, I will present the verbatim transcripts of the spoken
interactions of two DUI hearings, one from each setting. I have decided to use a
minimum of technical notation. A series of dots .... in the middle or at the end of
a sentence indicates that there is a small pause or hesitation in the speech.
Necessary explanatory remarks are inserted in the text within brackets [ ]. The
letters ADA refer to assistant district attorney in the Finnish court. The letters PD
refer to public defender in the California court. One US Dollar is currently worth
about 4.20 Finnish Marks, making the Finnish Mark worth roughly one quarter of a
Dollar.
I have translated the contents of the Finnish hearing into English myself, knowing
full well that it is impossible to provide a translation that would accurately convey
all the meanings and nuances across cultures.
Transcript of the Finnish DUI trial
001 Judge:   Next case number five, the people versus HK. All right, you
002                 are HTK. Please take a seat there. R90 dash 125, prosecutor
003                  district attorney EK, defendant machinist HTK, complaint
004                 driving under the influence of alcohol. New paragraph. You
005                 can give me the birth certificate. [Pause] The prosecutor gave
006                  the birth certificate and the appendices to the police report
007                 one to two. New paragraph. After this the prosecutor read
008                  and gave the complaint, appendix three. Go ahead, please.
009                ADA:  HTK, on the 5th of March 1990 in the city of L, on M Street,
010                drove a passenger car, register plate number ACX-297, after
011                 having consumed alcohol so that at the moment of testing his
012                 blood alcohol level was at least .058 percent. Therefore I
013                 demand that K will be punished for driving under the
014                 influence of alcohol, according to the Penal Code paragraph
015                 23:1. Additionally I demand that K shall pay restitution to the
016                 state for the cost of the blood alcohol test, 262 Marks.
017   Judge:    You are K, born twenty-five dash ten fifty-two?
018   Mr. HK: Yes.
019   Judge:     The social security number is 059 and the address is still this
020 30 T Street?
021    Mr. HK: Yes.
022    Judge:    Dependents one child. Is the income 7400 Marks per month
023 still true?
024   Mr. HK: Yes.
025  Judge:    Then you have told the following in the police interrogation:
026                  On the fifth of March, 1990, around five o'clock pm I had
027                   drunk one bottle of beer in a party. Between eight o'clock and
028                   eight forty I was in Bar T where I drank three bottles of beer.
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29 the last one just before driving away. I had not drunk other
30 alcoholic beverages during the day. I did not have so called
31 head start, and I have not used any medication. The
32 passenger car ACX-297 which is in my permanent possession
33 was parked in front of Bar T, from where I then drove away
34 in my car at eight forty. From there I then drove to a nearby
35 kiosk, about one hundred meters away, in order to go and
36 buy something to eat. Immediately after arriving in the kiosk
37 yard I was tested with a breathalyzer by a police officer who
38 had driven behind me, and at that point I was found to be
39 under the influence of alcohol. From there I was taken to a
40 blood test after which I was released. In my own opinion, I
41 was not drunk when I started driving, and my intention was
42 to drive home. This is your story. Is it correct?
43 Mr. HK: Yes.
44 Judge:    Then you were taken to this blood alcohol test and the blood
45 alcohol level at the time of the test has been .058 percent.
46 And then your driver's licence has been suspended on March
47 19, 1990. This is correct?
48 Mr. HK: Yes.
49 Judge:     So you confirm the information recorded in this police report?
50 Mr. HK: Yes.
51 Judge:     The defendant K admitted that the information on his vital
52 statistics is valid and repeated his story which is recorded in
53 the police report. What do you say about the complaint? Do
54 you admit it's correct or do you dispute it?
55 Mr. HK: The complaint is correct, yes.
56 Judge:    And he admitted that the complaint is correct. Do you have
57 anything else to state?
58 Mr. HK: Well, only that I'd ask that I'd get the driver's licence back as
59 soon as possible because I need to drive in my work.
60 Judge:    What kind of work do you do?
61 Mr. HK: Well, my main occupation is machinist, but this is such a
62 small firm that we must go and do installation and service
63 work, too.
64 Judge:    Trips...? [inaudible]
65 Mr. HK: Yes, in this city, one necessarily needs a car.
66 Judge:    And he asked that the suspension of the driver's licence
67 would be ordered to be as short as possible in duration
68 because in his work he must visit different locations in the
69 city and needs a car for this purpose. Do you have anything
70 else to say?
71 Mr. HK: No.
72 Judge:     Has the prosecutor anything to say?
73 ADA:     Nothing to add.
74 Judge:    Well, if you would step into the hall for a moment and wait.
75 so the verdict will be made.
[Pause; everyone except the judge, the judge intern and the clerk leaves the
courtroom.]
76 Judge:    You may now take seats. HK is sentenced for driving under
77 the influence of alcohol to pay twenty daily fines of seventy-
78 four Marks each, in other words, to pay a fine of 1480 Marks,
79 and in accordance to the penal code paragraph 23.1, to have
80 his driver's licence suspended until June 26, 1990. K must
81 pay restitution to the state for the costs of the alcohol test, 262
82 Marks. The court considers it proven that on March 5, 1990, K
83 has driven a passenger car ACX-297 in the city of L on M
84 Street after having consumed alcohol so that his blood alcohol
85 level at the time of the test was at least .058 percent. The
86 proof is the alcohol test and the confession of the defendant.
87 Therefore the court has sentenced as stated above. A party
88 dissatisfied with this verdict may appeal to the superior court
89 of P within 30 days in writing, and mis court must be
90 informed of the dissatisfaction by next Wednesday at the
91 latest. Here you get these forms for paying the fine and
92 instructions for appealing if you express your dissatisfaction.
While in the Finnish court the single case of Mr. HK is clearly a unit with a
well marked beginning and an end, this is not so in the California court The
cases are handled in batches. In my example, the batch contains four cases. In
order to save space, I will include here only the first part of the handling of
this  batch,  the  part  which  contains  the  entire  process  for  the  first  of  the  four
defendants, Mr. IJ.
Transcript of the California DUI hearing
1 Bailiff:   Following people please approach the microphone. These are
2 more DUI matters. U, RF, GS, CJ.
3 PD:        DH on behalf of Mr. J, Mr. F, Mr. S and Mr. J.  They've all
been
4 advised of their constitutional rights and signed
5 acknowledgement forms to that effect They've all been
6 advised of the charges against them and they waive further
7 reading, they will each be entering pleas of guilty to vehicle
8 code, section 23152A. Balance and charges to be dismissed.
9 Their counsel has advised them of the nature of the charges
10 against them, possible defenses to those charges and the
11 consequences of the plea of guilty. Each has initialed, signed
12 and executed a plea form waiving their constitutional rights
13 thereon with the exception of their right to counsel, and their
14 attorney joins in their plea and waivers, believing them to
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15 have been entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
16 Judge: Did you have an opportunity to discuss your case with your
17 counseling attorney, Mr. J?
18 Mr. U: Yes.
19 Judge: Mr. F? Am I saying your name right? How do you say your
20 last name?
21 Mr. RF: [Utters the correct pronunciation].
22 Judge: [Repeats the pronunciation]. Okay, and your answer was,
23 yes?
24 Mr. RF: Yes.
25 Judge: Mr. S?
26 Mr. GS: Yes.
27 Judge: Mr. CJ?
28 Mr. CJ: Yes, and I got ah I was readvised to ah change my plea to no
29 contest.
30 Judge: Okay. I´ll hand the form to counsel and you can make that
31 change right now.
32 PD: Is this for Mr. S, your honor?
33 Judge: Mr. CJ.... is changing his to no contest. Do you have any
34 questions concerning the contents of the plea form or the
35 entry of your plea, Mr. IJ?
36 Mr. IJ: Pardon?
37 Judge: Do you have any questions concerning the contents of the
38 plea form or the entry of your plea?
39 Mr. IJ: Ahm ... just how much I'm supposed to pay.
40 Judge: Okay, that's when we get to the sentence, I'll tell you about
41 that. Do you have any other questions?
42 Mr. U: No.
43 Judge: Okay. Mr. F?
44 Mr. RF: No.
45 Judge: Mr. S?
46 Mr. GS: No.
47 Judge: Mr. CJ?
48 Mr. CJ: No.
49 Judge: Do you understand the mandatory maximum and minimum
50 penalties for a conviction for this offense and any later
51 conviction for a same or similar offense, Mr. IJ?
52 Mr. U: Yes.
53 Judge: Mr. F?
54 Mr. RF: Yes.
55 Judge: Mr. S?
56 Mr. GS: Yes.
57 Judge: Mr. CJ?
58 Mr. CJ: Yes.
59 Judge: To the charge that you violated vehicle code section 23152A,
60 how do you plead, guilty or not guilty, Mr. IJ?
61 Mr. U:    Guilty.
62 Judge:     Mr. F?
63 Mr. RF: Guilty.
64 Judge:     Mr. S?
65 Mr. GS: Guilty.
66 Judge:     Mr. Q?
67 Mr. CJ:  No contest.
68 Judge:     Mr. IJ, the complaint alleges that on or about September 24,
69 1990, you violated vehicle code section 23152A, by driving a
70 motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol with a
71 blood alcohol level of .30; is that what you did?
72 Mr. IJ:    Yes.
73 Judge:    Mr. F, the complaint alleges that on or about July 31, 1990,
74 you violated vehicle code section 23152A, by driving a motor
75 vehicle while under the influence of alcohol with a blood
76 alcohol level of .17; is that what you did?
77 Mr. RF: Yes.
78 Judge:     Mr. S, the complaint alleges that on or about September 23,
79 1990, you violated vehicle code section 23152A, by driving a
80 motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol with a
81 blood alcohol level of .19, is that what you did?
82 Mr. GS: Yes.
83 Judge:     Mr. CJ, the complaint alleges that on or about September 8,
84 1990, you violated vehicle code section 23152A, by driving a
85 motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol with a
86 blood alcohol level of .19, are those the facts you're not
87 contesting?
88 Mr. CJ:   Yes, your honor.
89 Judge:    The court accepts your pleas, makes the findings in order as
90 set out on the plea form directly above the court signature.
91 The people's motion to dismiss the balance of each complaint is
92 granted. Mr. IJ, I sentence you to one hundred eighty
93 days in the custody of the sheriff. Execution of sentence
94 suspended for five years on the following terms and
95 conditions of probation: that you violate no laws, that you
96 obey the standard alcohol conditions, that you attend the first
97 conviction program, that you pay a fine of nine hundred
98 thirty nine dollars plus fifty one dollars to the crime victims
99 fund, that your driver's license be restricted for ninety days,
100 that you do twenty days of volunteer work. Do you accept
101 probation on those terms and conditions?
102 Mr. IJ:   Yes.
103 Judge:     All right, that will be the order.  For what organization do you
104 want to do the volunteer work?
105 Mr. IJ:   Ahm.. . Little League Park.
106 Judge:    Little League?
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107 Mr. IJ: Yeah, ... Park.
108 Judge: Little League Park.
109 PD: [Inaudible; requests a sidebar conference with the judge.]
110 Judge: All right. If you really think it's necessary. [Goes to the
side to confer with the PD and the prosecutor.]
111 PD2: Your honor.
112 Judge: Yes?
113 PD 2: May I inquire? [Calls five defendants to
114 counseling.] GM, AF, EH, EJ, LH.
115  Judge: [Returns to the bench.] Okay, Mr. LJ, that sounds like a fine
116 plan for volunteer work. Ahm, do you need time to pay the
117 fine?
118 Mr. IJ: Yes.
119 Judge: How much time do you need?
120 Mr. IJ: Ahm... what's the maximum?
121 Judge: Ahm... well are you employed?
122 Mr. II: No ...on SSI [Social Security Insurance/Disability].
123 Judge: Okay, how about one year?
124 Mr. IJ: Yes.
125 Judge: Okay? Try to make...
126 Mr. IJ: I can do it before.
127 Judge: Do the best you can but in... in no event longer than one year,
128 okay?
129 Mr. IJ: Okay.
130 Judge: But you might want to try to make periodic payments,
131 although I'm not going to make that a requirement, okay?
132 Mr. IJ: Okay.
133 Judge: All right, and I asked, did I ask? Do you accept probation on
134 all these terms and conditions that we just talked about?
135 Mr. IJ: Yes. Okay, on probation?
136 Judge: You're going to be on probation for five years.
137 Mr. IJ: With a pro... probation officer?
138 Judge: No, not with a probation officer.
139 Mr. IJ: Okay.
140 Judge: What that means is, if you get another violation for driving
141 under the influence in the five years, your probation can be
142 revoked and you can be ordered to serve the custody.
143 Mr. IJ: ... hmm.
144 Judge: So for that whole five year period you want to do all of the
145 things that you are supposed to do, okay?
146 Mr. IJ: Yeah.
147 Judge: All right, that will be the order. Good luck.
148 Mr. IJ: Hmm.
149 Judge: Mr. F, I sentence you to one hundred eighty days in the
150 custody of the sheriff. Execution of sentence suspended for
151 five years on the following terms and conditions of probation:
152 that you violate no laws, that you obey the standard alcohol
153 conditions, that you attend the first conviction program, that
154 you pay a fine of nine hundred thirty nine dollars plus fifty
155 one dollars to the crime victims fund. That your license be
156 restricted for ninety days, that you perform five days of
157 public work service. Do you accept probation on those terms
158 and conditions?
159 Mr. RF: Yes.
160 Judge:    All right, that will be the order. Ah... do you need time to pay
161 the fine?
162 Mr. RF: Yes, I need six months.
163 Judge:     All right, that will be the order.
164 Clerk:     Ah... six months, your honor?
165 Judge:    Yes, six months to pay the fine. On the last case, ...ah ...Mr.
166 IJ, I didn't say how long he should have to do his volunteer
167 work. Let's make it six months.
168 Clerk:     Okay.
As I pointed out above, this excerpt is not an intact unit in the judge's work. Even
the batch of cases is not such a unit with clear boundaries - there is no pause
between the batches and fragments of upcoming batches appear in the middle of
ongoing batches (see lines 111 to 114 above). It seems that the unit for the judge
is an entire session. This was confirmed by the judge in her interview.
Judge: In fact, I think I probably take it by the session, morning and afternoon.
Interviewer: So that's the unit of your work?
Judge: Yes, every session is a new beginning and an end.
THE MULTIPLE DIALECTS OF THE JUDGES
Perhaps the most striking feature about the Finnish hearing is the extent to which
the compilation and dictation of the minutes dominates the interaction. In his
interview, the judge himself pointed this out at the outset.
Judge: Everything is focused on the minutes. The most important thing is that the
minutes are right, more important than anything else, because nobody pays
attention to anything else except to the correctness of the minutes. (...) So the
technical aspect takes most of the time.
There are large segments in the transcript in which the judge is addressing his speech
primarily to the emerging minutes (via the taperecorder), not to any of the people
present in the courtroom. I call this the dialect of document making. The judge quite
abruptly switches from this dialect to the more familiar dialect
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of adjudication, and back again. The very beginning of the transcript provides good
examples of such switches.
1 Judge:    Next case number five, the people versus HK. All right, you
2 are HTK. Please take a seat there. R90 dash 125, prosecutor
3 district attorney EK, defendant machinist HTK, complaint
4 driving under the influence of alcohol. New paragraph. You
5 can give me the birth certificate. [Pause] The prosecutor gave
6 the birth certificate and the appendices to the police report
7 one to two. New paragraph. After this the prosecutor read
8 and gave the complaint, appendix three. Go ahead, please.
Here the judge first talks to the defendant in the regular dialect of adjudication. He
then switches over to the dialect of document making - here printed in italics. He
then says to the prosecutor "You can give me the birth certificate" in the regular
dialect of adjudication, to return again to the dialect of document making, and to
finish again in the dialect of adjudication ("Go ahead, please").
There is one passage in the transcript where the judge talks in a way that doesn't
fit either one of the two dialects identified above. From line 058 to line 065, the
judge and the defendant discuss the latter's request to get his driver's licence back as
soon as possible because he needs it in his work. The judge asks "What kind of work
do you do?" (line 060) and subsequently another question about the trips involved in
the work (line 064). These questions go beyond the restricted legal script of a
standard DUI hearing in that they are not questions to which the police report
would already contain answers, only to be confirmed by the defendant. In fact,
the first question is nicely paradoxical: the police report tells that the defendant's
occupation is machinist, machinists do not by definition need to drive in their
work, yet the defendant says he needs to drive in his work - hence, what kind of
work does he really do? I call this the dialect of socio-economic adjustment. It is
the dialect of finding out about the defendant's lifeworld and adjusting the sentence
accordingly.
The dialect of adjudication is essentially that of proceeding toward the sentence
according to the standard legal script. The dialect of document making is that of
preparing a document that will fulfill the standard requirements of clear and
complete court minutes. These two dialects are different in that the dialect of
adjudication follows above all the logic of substantively correct legal
procedure, while the dialect of document making follows the logic of
appropriate documentation regardless of the contents to be documented. Thus even
when the dialect of adjudication if temporarily abandoned as in the passage
concerning the defendant's work, that exceptional piece of conversation is
faithfully reproduced in the dialect of document making, as happens on lines 066 to
069.
It is interesting to note that the Finnish court procedure routinely offers to the judge a
fair amount of information pertaining to the defendant's socio-economic
situation: occupation, income, and number of defendants. All these are data that the
California judge does not encounter in the hearing. Similarly, the Finnish fine is
based on the income of the defendant while the California fine is fixed and the
same regardless of the economic means of the defendant.
The California Judge speaks in the dialect of adjudication, in this case
obviously not selecting between the arguments of adversaries but simply
proceeding according to the script toward the standard sentence. On lines 103 to
132 of the transcript, she also speaks richly in the dialect of socio-economic
adjustment. Her use of this dialect is not limited to questions about the
defendant's living conditions; she actually engages in a negotiation of a
workable plan for carrying out the volunteer work and paying the fine.
However, she also uses dialects that are missing in the Finnish hearing. These
include the dialect of prevention, the dialect of monitoring, and the dialect of
instruction.
The dialect of prevention is very closely related to the dialect of socio-
economic adjustment - these two are practically flip sides of the same coin. When
the judge gives the defendant a year to pay the fine (lines 123 to 132), she not
only wants to take the defendant's life situation into consideration. She is also
attending to the 'business' of the court system in processing the caseload.
Judge: What we can't afford to do is keep seeing these people over and over and
over again. So, the reason I say how much time do you need to pay is that I am
very, very liberal in the amount of time I'll give them to pay. I am real hard
on the people who come back and have had a long time and still haven't paid.
And further:
Judge: It is too hard on the system to have them keep coming back. (...) My
philosophy is how can I help the defendant to become law-abiding, how can I
make being law-abiding accessible. Because if it's not accessible, then they
are going to be non-law-abiding, they are going to break the law. I want
everybody, as soon as possible, to have driver's licence and to have insurance,
to have registration.
In other words, the judge wants to prevent the sentence from becoming a cause for
new offenses and new visits to the court - which would further increase the pressure
on the court. Failures to pay the fine within the given period of time lead to new
hearings and thus to an increased caseload. Thus the judge wants to make sure that
the defendant expresses a clear and unambiguous commitment
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to fulfilling the terms of probation. In the hearings, this dialect becomes
dominant typically when the judge emphasizes an exact date by which the fine
must have been paid. In the case analyzed here, this dialect surfaces briefly on
lines 127 to 128: "in no event longer than one year, okay?"
Admittedly this is not a strong example of the dialect of prevention. In other
hearings conducted by the same judge, there are clearer examples. The judge is
as if alerted and changes her dialect noticeably whenever there is ambiguity
concerning the date by which the fine must be paid. The following example is
a case in point.
Judge: You are going to have to give a higher priority to this matter. I
appreciate that you have a limited amount of income and that you want to
pay your bills, but this is probably your only creditor who can put you in
jail and revoke your probation. I am willing to work with you and give
you more time, but you haven't done anything and you're still not
offering me anything except a vague statement that maybe in December
you'll have some money. I, I need concrete facts, "on this date I will pay
X number of dollars and I need this much more time to pay the balance",
then I'll work with you but not with vagaries.
Defendant: I... I can pay it on the first of December.
This excerpt is interesting in that the judge's dialect of prevention actually
acquires a flavor of the dialect of instruction when she didactically tells the
defendant how to be concrete. It may also be pointed out that the judge talks
about 'working with' the defendant, a phrase highly unlikely to be used by the
Finnish judge.
The dialect of monitoring is a 'metacognitive' dialect of supervising,
coordinating and planning, as well as checking and pointing out errors or
omissions in the forms produced and actions performed by the public
defenders, prosecutors, clerks, and interpreters - as well as by the judge
herself. In the case selected for the present analysis, there are two minor
examples where the judge uses the dialect of monitoring her own actions. On
line 133, she asks: "All right, and I asked, did I ask?" And later, on lines 165
to 166, she says: "...ah ...Mr. IJ, I didn't say how long he should have (...)"
The use of the dialect of monitoring others is, however, much more common
throughout the hearings. These situations often involve collaborative checking
and troubleshooting. On lines 28 to 33 of the transcript, we see one such
example, involving an exchange between the judge, the defendant, and the
public defender. Here is a further example from another hearing on the same
afternoon:
Judge: All right, that will be the order. I don't have an advisal slip of
constitutional rights from Mr. H, so I'll need that before he goes into the
clerk's office.
PD: Ah ... don't we also need a victims', for the victims' names...? Judge:
All right, and we need a victims list. Okay. Same counsel will take
care of the matter of the victims' names. You may go into the
clerk's office.
Here the judge's initial monitoring about the missing advisal slip leads the
public defender to notice the missing victims list. In the interview, the judge
comments on such events.
Judge: The public defenders are overworked, trying to counsel every single
person who comes in every morning. So they, being human beings and
being overworked, they tend to make a lot of mistakes on the plea forms
that they fill out. The prosecutor seems to make fewer errors. But it is
the same thing, they are overworked, too, and so, as I am the one with
the responsibility, I guess I'm the one who has to make sure that it all
falls together.
And later she explains why the monitoring tends to happen in a collaborative
manner.
Judge: Normally a judge wouldn't do that. Normally the judge would just
reject the paperwork, say go away and fix it and come back. But we can't
do that here, because we don't have time. And also it's not the defendant's
fault, it's the fault of the attorney. So my philosophy is I just try to fix it.
The dialect of instruction is evident in the transcript on lines 140 to 146. The
defendant asks a question that indicates to the judge that he has not quite
understood what the sentence implies. She then rather didactically explains the
legal contents of the sentence. This may be a dialect that is partially replaced in
the Finnish court by the meticulous practice of document making. Listening to
the judge dictating the minutes may have an unintended didactic function. And
the availability of detailed minutes may in many cases help the client
understand what actually was the content of the sentence and on what grounds
was it decided.
Table 2.1 sums up the multiple dialects the judges were found to use in these
two court hearings.
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Table 2.1
Dialects employed by the Finnish judge and the California judge
The California judge
The dialect of adjudication
The dialect of instruction
The dialect of socio-economic
adjustment
                                                     The dialect of prevention
                                                   The dialect of monitoring
These findings open up interesting questions about the impact of rationalization
on expertise. Traditionally rationalization has been seen as process of
deskilling, reducing expertise to standardized routines. In the California court,
such effects are visible.
Judge: Oh, and the other thing that I am ashamed to say on a tape recording,
that my brain is in suspended animation practically. It doesn't even do
things it used to do. So that I see so many people that they can go into the
bail office, they come back five minutes later and I do not remember
them. Or, if I remember them, I don't remember what they are there
for.
But these effects don't seem to be the most important and interesting ones. The
really interesting feature is the emergence of new dialects, of new 'mental
registers' that the judge must employ in order to cope with the complexity.
These new dialects don't seem to have much to do with the traditional
prestigious core of judicial expertise and legal thinking. They are mundane
dimensions of daily routine. And yet they seem to be key cognitive components
of what Seron (1990, p. 461-462) calls "a more activist judicial posture toward
management of cases", associated with the ongoing "systemic push" in courts.
THE STANDARD ACTIONS OF THE JUDGES
Both judges handle the DUI case in the courtroom by proceeding through
certain standard actions. By standard actions I mean procedural steps that
follow the legal script of a minimal, disturbance-free case. The script and
sequence of these actions is, however, significantly different in the two cultural
settings.
In the Finnish court, the standard actions proceed as follows:
1. Presenting the case (lines 001 to 016)
2. Matching the defendant with the file (lines 017 to 057 and 069 to 073)
3. Deliberating the verdict (lines 074 to 075)
4. Sentencing (lines 076 to 092)
In a graphic form, the logic of these actions is depicted in Figure 2.3.
The Finnish judge
The dialect of adjudication
The dialect of document making
The dialect of socio-economic
adjustment
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The first action of presenting the case is actually aimed at producing the first section
of the minutes, consisting of the birth certificate of the defendant, the police report,
and the complaint. The second action of matching the defendant with the file is
aimed at producing a sentencable case, i.e.,  one in which the documents and
the defendant in flesh-and-blood merge together through the latter's confirmation of
the validity of the documents.
The third action of deliberating the verdict is a rather empty anachronism in this
type of cases where the verdict is reached through a simple, highly schematized
matching between the penal code and the case. The unofficial sentencing
guidelines adopted by the court function here as a pretty clearcut instrument (in
more complex cases, legal precedents are typical instruments). Finally the fourth
action of sentencing is again aimed at producing the minutes, this time the sentence
part
In the California court, the sequence of standard actions looks like this:
1. Matching the defendant with the file (lines 003 to 018, 049 to 052, 059
to 061, and 068 to 072)
2. Sentencing, or matching the case with the legal code (lines 092 to 102)
3. Adjusting, or matching the sentence with the defendant's life
situation (lines 103 to 104 and 116 to 117)
This sequence can again be depicted with the help of graphic models (Figure 2.4).
Here, too, the sentencing is highly constrained by its instruments. On the other
hand, deliberation is eliminated as a separate action. The big difference in
comparison to the Finnish case is the third standard action, adjusting. The script used
in the California court required that each defendant was asked about the time
needed for the payment of the fine, and many defendants were also asked about the
organization where they wanted to serve their volunteer work service. Volunteer
work was used in the cases when the defendant was not considered able to do more
strictly supervised and physically demanding public work service. Even in the
cases involving public work service, the defendant and judge often discussed
issues like where and within what time period the work service had to be
completed.
In Finnish courts, public work service and voluntary work have thus far not been
legal options, and the defendant's ability to pay has been assumed on the basis of the
reported income. Thus, no action of adjusting has been included in the standard script
for handling DUI cases.
F igure 2.4: The script of standard actions in the judging of the California DUI
case
Now that we know something about the multiplicity of the dialects used by the judges
and about the sequence of their standard actions, we may ask: What in the actions
sequences prompts the judges to change their dialects? What makes them expand and
step into registers that are outside their traditional roles?
DISTURBANCES, REPAIR ACTIONS AND LEARNING IN THE
HANDLING OF DUI CASES
In the Finnish DUI hearing, only one phase stands out as a deviation from the script.
It happens at the end of the second standard action, matching the defendant with
the file.
56 Judge:    And he admitted that the complaint is correct. Do you have
57 anything else to state?
58 Mr. HK: Well, only that I'd ask that I'd get the driver's licence back as
59 soon as possible because I need to drive in my work.
52 53
60 Judge:    What kind of work do you do?
61 Mr. HK: Well, my main occupation is machinist, but this is such a
62 small firm that we must go and do installation and service
63 work, too.
64 Judge:    Trips...? [inaudible)
65 Mr. HK: Yes, in this city, one necessarily needs a car.
66 Judge:     And he asked that the suspension of the driver's licence
67 would be ordered to be as short as possible in duration
68 because in his work he must visit different locations in the
69 city and needs a car for this purpose. Do you have anything
70 else to say?
71 Mr. HK: No.
Although in practice it has become quite common that DUI defendants express
wishes regarding the length of the suspension of their driver's licences, the standard
script would assume that to the judge's routine question on lines 057 and 058, the
answer would be 'No'. Thus, the defendant's question is a mild disturbance. The
judge's repair action is that of assuming temporarily the dialect of socio-economic
adjustment (lines 060 and 064), only to return to the script through the gateway of
the detached dialect of document making (lines 066 to 069). The question 'Do you
have  anything else  to  say?'  (on  lines  069 to  070)  is  in  effect  a  repetition  of  the
question that started the disturbance (on lines 056 to 057) and it signals the
closing of that episode and a return to normalcy.
This disturbance did not lead to a substantive reconceptualization of the object of
the  judge's  work.  In  other  words,  it  was  resolved  in  regressive  manner.  When
viewing the videotaped hearing, the judge commented on the defendant's request as
follows.
Judge: Well, one doesn't always have to take it... what the defendant says,
whether it's true or not. I mean, he can just as well say that yes, he needs the
licence. (...) Sometimes they even have some papers and certificates, that they
need it. So that is relatively... But it's always considered, because the law
requires, if it's because of the occupation. And here the suspension of the
licence would have been longer if it had not been taken into consideration a
little bit, so it would have been. Our minimum has been four [months], and
here if I recall he got probably only three, about three months. Since a part of
that time had already passed, he'll get it back already at the end of May, so it
won't be long anymore.
Actually the judge remembers the date wrong. The defendant will get his licence
back only at the end of June, not at the end of May. The judge thought that he took
the defendant's request into consideration and it had some effect on the length of
the suspension. The defendant, however, thought otherwise.
Mr. HK: I need it, I need my driver's licence. I must... I've driven a car for 19 years,
so it... it goes like that. You don't even remember that you don't have it. Since
it doesn't affect your driving performance in any way, whether you have the
licence or not. I don't understand why the judge cannot give it back. I don't
know what the minimum penalty is - is it three? Or not necessarily anything.
Interviewer: What do you think, was your request taken into consideration?
Mr. HK: Not at all, in my opinion. (...)
Interviewer Do you have an opinion about what would be a just sentence here, or a
decision you'd be satisfied with?
Mr. HK: Well, I've been without my licence for two months, and now I've got about
1500 to 1600 Marks fines to pay. I think it's a pretty hard sentence for such a
small excess [in the blood alcohol level].
Interviewer: You mean that would be a sufficient sentence?
Mr. HK: Yes, I think that two months without the licence and 1500 Marks fine, it's
pretty appropriate.
Interestingly enough, the defendant quite clearly hints at the possibility that being
without the licence leads him to break the law again by driving without a licence.
Later the interviewer asks whether the defendant thinks that the judge understood what
defendant's request was.
Mr. HK: Yes, I think it should have become quite clear to him. I mean, I could not
tell the judge that I'm forced to driving without the licence. If I had said that,
he would have given me more
This aspect is not considered by the judge in his interview answers. The judge was
asked about his view of the meaning of the sentence to the defendant.
Judge: You mean the meaning of the sentence for me or for him? For me it
does not...
Interviewer: No, I mean for the defendant. Judge: No, they usually know it.
Usually they anticipate what they'll get.
There is no trace here of the dialect of prevention. In fact there is a wide gap between
the defendant's notion of an appropriate sentence and the judge's basic conception of
DUI cases.
Judge: I think driving under the influence is a bad crime. I mean even a case like this.
(...) So driving under the influence, when you ask for my personal opinion, it
is a terrible crime.
The judge actually states that the defendant "seemed to be quite satisfied, no
problem." But he quickly adds:
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Judge: It [the sentence] is given, and then it won't be changed anymore. (...) I say in
court that this case is so and that's it [Jokingly:] That's the way it is at home,
too. No negotiation, it's like this.
What is regressive about the resolution of the disturbance is not that the judge and the
defendant disagree. The regressiveness stems from the fact that there is no shared
elaboration of the sentence in relation to the defendant's life situation. If the
judge elaborates on the defendant's request, he does it alone during the
deliberation, not interactively. This allows for no mutual reinterpretation of the
situation and, correspondingly, calls for no explicit commitment from the
defendant. The judge regards a DUI case like this a strictly scripted, unalterable
unit.
Interviewer How did the decision making happen in this case?
Judge: There is not much to it. It is almost like a rubber stamp case.
Interviewer. So the only thing was that request of his?
Judge: Well, even that wasn't anything as such. These DUI decisions one could
almost give like with a rubber stamp. There was no real deliberation.
Interviewer: Are these necessary hearings, then? Judge: Well, one must sentence
them. There is no other instance to do it.
This attitude may also have something to do with routinization through extensive
experience. The Finnish judge has worked for 16 years as municipal court judge.
In the California hearing, there are altogether six disturbances and associated repair
actions. The first two take place in connection to the first standard action,
matching the defendant with the file. Interestingly enough, they are launched by
almost the very same question that launched the only disturbance in the Finnish case.
33 Judge          Mr. CJ.... is changing his to no contest. Do you have any
34                       questions concerning the contents of the plea form or the
35                      entry of your plea, Mr. U?
36   Mr. IJ                Pardon?
37  Judge            Do you have any questions concerning the contents of the
38                       plea form or the entry of your plea?
39  Mr. IJ            Ahm ... just how much I'm supposed to pay.
40  Judge            Okay, that's when we get to the sentence, I'll tell you about
41                       that. Do you have any other questions?
42 Mr. IJ             No.
Here the first disturbance is utterly simple: on line 036, instead of answering 'No'
like a script-abiding defendant should, Mr. U answers 'Pardon?', indicating that
he has either not understood or not heard the question. The judge's repair action is
equally simple: she repeats the question (lines 037 to
038). However, that immediately launches another disturbance: instead of
answering 'No', the defendant asks how much he's supposed to pay. The judge's
repair action uses the dialect of instruction: 'Okay, that's when we get to the
sentence, I'll tell you about that" (lines 040 to 041). Here, the relatively novel dialect
of instruction is evoked by the disturbance. It should be noted that at this point,
the judge doesn't realize that there is anything exceptional about the defendant, Mr.
LI (see below).
The next disturbance occurs in connection to the the third standard action, adjusting,
or matching the sentence with the defendant's life situation.
103 Judge:     All right, that will be the order. For what organization do you
104 want to do the volunteer work?
105 Mr. LI: Ahm. . . Little League Park.
106 Judge: Little League?
107 Mr. LI: Yeah, ... Park.
108 Judge: Little League Park.
109 PD: [Inaudible; requests a sidebar conference with the judge.]
110 Judge: All right If you really think it's necessary. [Goes to the
side to confer with the PD and the prosecutor.]
111 PD 2:      Your honor.
112 Judge:     Yes?
113 PD 2:     May I inquire? [Calls five defendants to
114 counseling.] GM, AF, EH, EJ, LH.
115 Judge:     [Returns to the bench.] Okay, Mr. LI, that sounds like a fine
116 plan for volunteer work. Ahm, do you need time to pay the
117 fine?
Here, instead of giving a name of an acceptable organization, the defendant names
the Little League Park as his volunteer work site (line 105). The judge is baffled.
Then the public defender steps in and asks for a sidebar conference with the judge.
In other words, the first repair action is collaborative. The judge grants (line 110)
and holds the sidebar conference which is joined by the prosecutor, too. In the
interview, I asked the judge about this episode.
Judge: His mother was with him and he was very limited in what he could do.
Interviewer I suppose he was mildly retarded, or...? Judge: Right, so I decided to
let him do whatever he wanted to do. Interviewer I just wondered why the public
defender did not inform you
clearly about the nature of the case and that he actually had to have a side
bar.
Judge: I know. I don't know. Interviewer: As soon as the man started walking, you
could see that he was somehow handicapped. But when he was standing there, there
was no way you could see?
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Judge: No, I didn't. I didn't know. That's why I thought 'Little League', for crying out
loud!
As the judge returns to the bench, she further repairs the disturbance by using the
dialect of socio-economic adjustment in a very determined manner: 'that sounds like
a fine plan for volunteer work' (lines 115 to 116). Another related disturbance
follows immediately as the defendant, instead of requesting a certain amount of
time for payment asks 'what's the maximum?'. Now the judge systematically
works in the dialect of socio-economic adjustment, negotiating a very flexible
plan for the defendant (lines 121 to 132).
The next disturbance is curiously connected to the second standard action,
sentencing or matching the case with the legal code.
133 Judge:     All right, and I asked, did I ask? Do you accept probation on
134 all these terms and conditions that we just talked about?
135 Mr. IJ: Yes. Okay, on probation?
136 Judge: You're going to be on probation for five years.
137 Mr. IJ: With a pro... probation officer?
138 Judge: No, not with a probation officer.
139 Mr. IJ: Okay.
140 Judge: What that means is, if you get another violation for driving
141 under the influence in the five years your probation can be
142 revoked and you can be ordered to serve the custody.
143 Mr. IJ:   ... hmm.
144 Judge:     So for that whole five year period you want to do all of the
145 things that you are supposed to do, okay?
146 Mr. IJ:    Yeah.
147 Judge:     All right, that will be the order. Good luck.
148 Mr. IJ:    Hmm.
This time, it is not the defendant but the judge herself who initiates the
disturbance. She has already once asked the defendant whether he accepts the
probation on the given conditions (lines 100 to 101) and she has received the
scripted 'Yes' answer (line 102). But the complexity of the situation makes her forget
that, and she asks the question again. Now the defendant expresses uncertainty
about understanding the sentence (lines 135 and 137) and the judge repairs the
disturbance by using the dialect of instruction. Although her closing comment on
line 147 ('All right, that will be the order. Good luck.’) is exactly according to the
script, the presence of disturbance is not totally ruled out, as may be seen in the
defendant's reaction: 'Hmm' (line 148).
The last disturbance is also self-initiated by the judge. It is related to the the third
standard action, adjusting, or matching the sentence with the defendant's life
situation.
165 Judge:     Yes, six months to pay the fine. On the last case, ...ah ...Mr.
166 IJ. I didn't say how long he should have to do his volunteer
167 work. Let's make it six months.
168 Clerk:    Okay.
Here Mr. IJ has already left the courtroom. But in the middle of the next case, the
judge suddenly remembers that she failed to agree with Mr. IJ on the amount of
time given to complete the volunteer work. She quickly repairs that using what I
interpret to be the dialect of socio-economic adjustment. Since that dialect is
inherently dialogic and the dialogue partner is no longer present, the judge uses the
clerk as a substitute partner: Let's make it six months'. And the clerk responds:
Okay'.
In order to obtain a more representative picture of the disturbances and repair actions,
I analyzed the transcripts of all the DUI cases with guilty or no contest pleas handled
during the afternoon session that included also the case of Mr. IJ. There were 21 DUI
cases during that afternoon. In fourteen cases, a plea of guilty or no contest was
submitted. In those fourteen cases, I identified 32 disturbances. This means an
average of 2.3 disturbances per case. The disturbances were connected to the
three standard actions as shown in table 2.2.
Table 2.2
The distribution of disturbances in DUI hearings during one session in the
California court
_______________________________________________________
                                Number of disturbances
13
13
6
In the corresponding repair actions, 35 distinct uses of
dialects were identified (in three repair actions, the judge
used two dialects). The distribution of those dialects is
shown in Table 2.3.
Standard action
1. Matching
2. Sentencing
3. Adjusting
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Table 2.3
The distribution of dialects used by the California judge in repair ing
disturbances
Dialect used in repair action
Standard action Adjudication Instruction Adjustment Prevention Monitoring
1. Matching                 1 3                -             -                      9
2. Sentencing                - 2                 -             -                     12
3. Adjusting                 -                     -                4             2                     2
Table 2.3 shows that the standard actions of matching and sentencing elicited
mainly disturbances that led to repair by monitoring, and to a lesser degree to
repair by instruction. The standard actions of adjusting elicited disturbances
that led to repair by socio-economic adjustment, prevention and monitoring. In
other words, the action of adjusting the sentence to the life situation of the
defendant has qualitatively different implications from the other two standard
actions. This poses an interesting question to the Finnish court which has no
such action of adjusting in its standard script.
Furthermore, Table 2.3 shows that the dialect of monitoring is quite dominant
in the repair actions of the California judge. This reflects the fact that there is
an amazing amount of small troubles with the paperwork and also with
translations both in matching the defendant with the file and in formulating the
sentence. These disturbances commonly require active involvement and
collaboration of two or more persons in the courtroom.
From the examples analyzed above, it seems clear that disturbances tend to
push the judges into taking up novel, non-scripted dialects such as the dialect of
socio-economic adjustment, the dialect of instruction, and the dialect of
monitoring. Such moves to adopt novel dialects are crucial forms of learning.
Such learning is not simply learning by 'tuning' and perfecting the standard
performance (see Norman, 1982). The adoption of novel dialects seems to
require stepping out of the ordinary routine, into the realm of experimentation
and construction.
These expansive moves are certainly partly spontaneous situational responses
to unexpected contingencies. However, there are indications that such moves
may also become conscious innovative strategies. In the California court, the
dialect of socio-economic adjustment seems to be part of the routine script. But
in her interview, the judge clarified the issue as follows.
Judge: Not all judges do that. For example somebody else was here yesterday
[as a substitute; Y.E.] and the clerks told me that that judge said that I
don't want to talk to anybody about converting any fines into public work
service, I don't want to talk to anybody about time to pay, and he also
ordered the clerks not to have any pauses between the cases. (...) But the
reason I do that, I have a lot of reasons why I do that. One of them is that
a lot of the cases on my calendar are people who were sentenced before by
another judge. Since I've only been here 30 days and, well, not even 30
days, and I'm only going to be here 30 days more, I see, I don't know, ten
or twenty people a day who are sentenced by other judges, probably more
than that, and haven't done what they said they were going to do. I
sincerely believe that if the last judge had worked with them a little bit
more when they were being sentenced, they might have been more
realistic at the outset and they wouldn't be back seeing me again. (...) I
would rather they took a really long time to pay than that they came back
to the court over and over and over again. So I'll give anybody six
months to pay a driving under the influence fine, which is about $1000.
The guidelines before I got here from the last judge were four months. I
don't think four months is enough time. I would have a hard time paying
a fine of $1000 in four months and I think that I'm probably better
situated than a lot of these people.
The judge's answer indicates that the standard action of adjusting could quite
well be performed by using the dialect of regular adjudication - that is, by
simply stating how much time the defendant is granted for paying the fine ("I
don't  want  to  talk  to  anybody about  time to  pay")  and where  he  or  she  must
perform the voluntary work. Here the judge is consciously stepping out of
such previously established and commonly used script, to construct a novel
script for her own work. This expansive move cannot be attributed to a lot of
direct experience. To the contrary, the judge has worked in this setting for less
than a month, and as municipal court judge only a year. One is tempted to
hypothesize that the very lack of routine is here a precondition for innovative
learning.
CONTRADICTIONS BEHIND DISTURBANCES
What causes the disturbances to appear in the first place? First of all, our
observations indicate that the disturbances described above are not just
accidental and arbitrary. They seem to be systemic. Perrow (1984) has written
about 'normal accidents', failures and breakdowns that are caused by the
complexity of the system itself. His material is drawn from large-scale
technological systems where disturbances often reach a spectacular scale.
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Courts are not very large organizations and they rely on low level technology, yet their
social organization is complex. Consequently, their disturbances are typically local
rather than global and commonplace rather than spectacular. But they are no less
systemic and 'normal'.
To understand how systemic disturbances arise, one needs conceptual tools to analyze
the activity system of the court. I will here employ an extended version of the
triangular model I have already used above in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 (for theoretical
background of the model, see Engeström, 1987; for prior examples of application, see
Engeström, 1990). I will take one more close look at two key disturbances in the
examples used above: the defendant's request for short suspension of his driver's
licence in the Finnish hearing (lines 056 to 071), and the defendant's suggestion of
Little League Park as the organization of his volunteer work in the California
hearing (lines 103 to 117). In interpreting the causative background of these
disturbances, I will hypothetically identify certain contradictions in the activity
systems of the respective courts.
In both cases the disturbance is launched by the defendant's request. In other words, its
point of initiation is the object of the judge's work. The defendant's request goes
beyond the information recorded in the file and thus creates a mismatch. In the
Finnish court, that mismatch is only heard and recorded in the minutes. The judge
repairs it regressively, by using the dialect of document making. But the mismatch is
not elaborated interactively because the rules of the scripted procedure exclude such
interactive elaboration. This is a systemic contradiction between a fundamentally
unpredictable object and inflexible procedural rules. This contradiction is
schematically depicted in Figure 2.5 (which is an extension of the second action in
Figure 2.3). Tensions between the components of the activity system are indicated
with the help of two-headed lightning arrows.
In the California court, the defendant's initial request is elaborated interactively.
But the elaboration is first blocked by missing information. The judge does not know
why the defendant presents such an unusual request ('Little League Park').
The documents in front of the judge do not give her the needed information. The
documents are highly standardized forms in which almost all information is in the
form of filled blanks. Additional freely formulated information is practically
excluded. In other words, there is a systemic contradiction between a fundamentally
unpredictable object and inflexible instruments.
In her interview, the judge touched upon this contradiction when asked what would be
the first thing she would like to have changed in the court's operation.
Judge: We need to automate. If we were automated, I think it would make all the
difference in the world. (...) I know that some things are automated but this is
something that just cries out for it because of the volume. If we were automated,
I would assume that the judge would have a computer on the bench and that when
a defendant appeared, would be able to plug it in and everything would be there
and wouldn't need all of this paper. If that happened, then the clerk wouldn't
have to spend two to three hours pulling all the files every morning and I
wouldn't have to spend all the time I do thumbing through this trying this trying
to figure out why the people are there, and neither would the prosecutor and
neither would the public defender.
Computerization may not solve the problems quite the way the judge hopes. Our
previous research in the use of computerized medical records (Engeström,
Engeström & Saarelma, 1988) indicates that while computerization of manual
forms may make the workflow more speedy and efficient, it often at the same time
aggravates and makes more visible the problems produced by a compartmentalized
division of labor in the activity system.
In the case of Mr. IJ, the forms have been filled by the prosecutor, the public defender
(together with the defendant), and the clerk. The disturbance launched by the
'Little League Park' request was a product of a division of labor in which these
members of the activity system were somehow working as if in their separate
compartments, not realizing that the judge might need additional information
concerning the defendant's disability. Thus, in addition to the contradiction between the
object and the instruments, there seems to be a systemic contradiction between a
fundamentally unpredictable object and inflexible division of labor. These two
contradictions are schematically depicted in Figure 2.6 (which is an extension of the
first action in Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.6: The contradictions behind the disturbance in the California court
The disturbance is repaired with the help of a collaborative action, the sidebar
conference between the judge, the prosecutor and the public defender - and
subsequently with the help of the judge's determined use of the dialect of
socio-economic adjustment.
At this point the contradictions identified above are only hypothetical
constructs. Their validity must be tested and their nature further elaborated in
analyses of more extensive and versatile data.
Keeping this reservation in mind, it is still instructive to consider the
implications of the contradictions. In the Finnish court, the crucial component
causing tension seems to be the rather inflexible procedural script. The script
makes it difficult for the judge to adjust the sentence to the life situation of the
defendant. In this script, there is one strategic component which potentially
invites disturbances, namely the question "Do you have anything else to say?' at
the end of the second standard action. The expected standard answer is 'No'.
But there is a qualitative difference between this 'No' and other 'Yes/No'
answers the defendant is expected to give. The other answers have already
been recorded in the documents and the judge is only checking that the
defendant confirms what he or she has previously stated. However, the answer
to  the  question  'Do  you  have  anything  else  to  say?'  is  by  definition  not
previously recorded. In that sense, this question always carries a possibility of
an unexpected deviation from the script.
Prevention of repeated or accumulated offenses by adjusting the sentence to the
life situation of the defendant is not a built-in feature in the procedural script
of the Finnish court. However, Mr. HK's interview indicates that driving
without a licence - which invites an accumulation of offenses - is a very real
possibility.
In the California court, the procedural script, revised by the judge, is more
flexible, corresponding to the much bigger and more complicated caseload in
which the issue of repeat offenders is crucially important. But this flexibility is
not reflected in the instruments and in the division of labor. To the contrary,
the instruments - above all the standard forms contained in the case file - are
so streamlined that they seem to make it nearly impossible to store and
transmit more freely formulated, content-rich information about the case. And
the division of labor effectively compartmentalizes the judge, the public
defenders, and the prosecutors into their own relatively closed niches, making
it difficult for them to see the activity and its emergent situations from each
other's viewpoints.
This latter point may be compared with Seron's (1990) observation according
to which the new organizational model of American courts relies increasingly
on teamwork. In the California court analyzed here, teamwork between the
different professional groups surfaced only as an emergency measure to repair
disturbances by calling a sidebar conference. Seron may well be right when
she notes that teamwork will eventually transcend bureaucratization and
deprofessionalization in courts (Seron, 1990, p. 461). But at least in the setting
analyzed in this paper, this transcendence is yet to take shape.
NOTE
1 Although this paper speaks in the voice of the first author, it is a product of collective work. The
following members of my research groups collaborated with me in the preparation of this paper: In
Finland, Julia Pihlaja and Vaula Haavisto, both of the project 'Developmental Study of Work in
Municipal Courts' at the University of Helsinki. In the United States, Katherine Brown, Ritva
Engeström, Judith Gregory, Robert Taylor and Chi-Cheng Wu, at the time all of the Laboratory of
Comparative Human Cognition at the University of California, San Diego. The research reported in
the paper has been financed by grants from the Finnish Ministry of Justice and from the Committee
on Research of the University of California, San Diego. Views expressed in the paper are solely those
of the author.
I am grateful to the judges, other personnel, and clients of the two courts from which the data in this
paper was collected. Michael Cole, Chuck and Candy Goodwin, David Middleton, Bud Mehan,
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versions of the paper.
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(Engeström, 1987) for work activity in courts looks something like the gray
field in Figure 3.1.
3. COORDINATION, COOPERATION, AND
COMMUNICATION IN COURTS: EXPANSIVE
TRANSITIONS IN LEGAL WORK
INTRODUCTION
Work in courts of law is among the most formal and rule-based processes in
industrialized societies. However, the intricate division of labor in court
organizations and the increasing complexity of the contents of cases give rise
to various kinds of disturbances and unexpected contingencies in interactions
inside and outside the courtroom.
In the United States as in many other countries, courts face rapidly growing
caseloads with much less impressive growth in the numbers of judges and
other personnel. As Heydebrand and Seron (1990) show, the way to cope with
this dilemma has been increasing rationalization. The means of rationalization
include novel techniques of scheduling as well as increasing reliance on
magistrates, probation officers, and law clerks instead of judges only. Most
importantly, they include new mechanisms for resolving and settling cases
before they enter the stage of a full-scale jury trial.
Rationalization is often regarded as synonymous either to bureaucratization in
the  Weberian  sense,  or  to  assembly-line  Fordism.  On  the  basis  of  a  careful
historical and statistical analysis, Heydebrand and Seron (1990, p. 157)
demonstrate that rationalization in courts is a much more open-ended
endeavor.
"The growth and complexity of the organizational structure of courts is an undeniable
development But there are few signs that such growth is bureaucratic in the sense of Weber's
model. Judicial case management has clearly played an important role in the rise of no-action
and pretrial dispositions. Yet, the mandatory settlement conference or other pretrial mechanisms
of dispute resolution are not necessarily 'bureaucratic' since they involve a host of informal
procedures that deviate from the formal adversary-adjudicatory model alike. What is perhaps
more crucial (...) is how these conferences are conducted, what mix of formal rational and
informal-social elements they use, and what innovative alternatives they admit into their arsenal
of conflict resolution techniques."
Heydebrand and Seron (1990, p. 156 and 157) further observe that the
developments in court organizations particularly in metropolitan areas "point
to the emergence of a highly elaborated network of organized activities" while
many judges' orientation and policies may be changing "from that of formal
adjudicators of cases to that of informal processors of disputes." In this light, I
hypothesize that the currently emerging zone of proximal development
Figure 3.1: The hypothesized zone of proximal development for work in
courts
Figure 3.1 implies that the zone of proximal development is a terrain of
constant ambivalence and struggle between at least three alternative directions
(fields 2, 3 and 4). The struggle is manifested in ruptures, disturbances and
expansive innovations in the routine flow of work.
I will look at one complex case of civil litigation that took place in the spring
of 1991 in the superior court of a large city in southern California. The case
involved a dispute over construction defects found in a 240-unit condominium
complex. The homeowners demanded approximately six million dollars from
the developer for repair of the defects. After a year and a half of pretrial
procedures and settlement attempts, the case went to a jury trial. The trial
lasted two weeks, one week less than estimated by the judge and the attorneys.
Forty-three witnesses testified and more than 200 exhibits were introduced
(the two parties had originally prepared more than seven hundred exhibits).
This case exemplifies the increased complexity of many cases of civil
litigation. It also also represents a test case for the independent calendar and
the delay reduction program, a case management strategy for dealing with the
volume of litigation in which the judge handling this case is an active
practitioner.
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THEORIZING EXPANSIVE TRANSITIONS
In analyses of work, a crucial question is how to combine the subject-object
and the subject-subject, or the instrumental and the communicative, aspects of
the activity. Arne Raeithel (1983) and Bemd Fichtner (1984) suggest a three-
level notion of the developmental forms of epistemological subject-object-
subject relations. The three levels are called coordination, cooperation, and
communication. I shall briefly sketch my interpretation of these levels and of
the possible mechanisms of transition between them.
I will call the normal scripted flow of interaction coordination. The various
actors are following their scripted roles, each concentrating on the successful
performance of the assigned actions, or on "the presentation of the self
(Goffman, 1959). The script, coded in written rules and plans or tacitly
assumed traditions, coordinates their actions as if from behind their backs,
without being questioned or discussed (Figure 3.2).
conceptualize and solve it. The participants go beyond the confines of the given
script, yet they do this without explicitly questioning or reconceptualizing the
script. Transitions to cooperation may occur in interactions between various
practitioners or between professionals and lay clients. The general structure of
cooperation in depicted in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.2: The general structure of coordination
In this and the following two diagrams, the unbroken boundaries indicate that
the entities are in the focus of the subjects' critical attention. The broken
boundaries indicate that the corresponding entities are not in the focus of
critical attention for the subjects.
By cooperation I mean modes of interaction in which the actors, instead of
each focusing on performing their assigned roles or presenting themselves,
focus on a shared problem, trying to find mutually acceptable ways to
Figure 3.3: The general structure of cooperation
y reflective communication I mean interactions in which the actors focus on
reconceptualizing their own organization and interaction in relation to their
shared objects. Both the object and the script are reconceptualized, as is the
interaction between the participants. Transitions to communication are rare in
the ongoing flow of daily work actions. The general structure of reflective
communication is depicted in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: The general structure of communication
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The mechanisms of transition between the levels include disturbances,
ruptures, and expansions (see Engeström, 1991; also Chapter 1 of this
volume). Disturbances are unintentional deviations from the script. They cause
discoordinations in interaction, which in turn may lead to (a) disintegration
(e.g., confusion and withdrawal), (b) contraction (e.g., by authoritative
silencing of some actors, or by softer evasion), or (c) expansion (i.e.,
collaborative reframing of the object by moving to cooperation or
communication). Expansions may also occur without being triggered by
immediately preceding disturbances.
While disturbances are deviations in the observable flow of interaction in the
ongoing activity, ruptures are blocks, breaks or gaps in the intersubjective
understanding and flow of information between two or more participants of
the activity. Ruptures don't ostensibly disturb the flow of the work process,
although they may often lead to actual disturbances. Ruptures are thus found
by interviewing and observing the participants outside of after the
performance of work actions.
Disturbances, ruptures and expansive transitions are crucially interesting as
manifestations of the zone of proximal development of the activity system. I
am especially interested in what facilitates expansive transitions, in particular
what kinds of linguistic and other tools are used and invented to initiate and
complete them.
procedural arguments of both parties and makes his or her ruling on that basis.
Sidebars often take place in the courtroom, in front of the bench. In our case,
they were held in the judge's chambers adjacent to the courtroom. Usually an
observer has no chance of hearing or recording the contents of the sidebars.
In the present case, the judge habitually asked the official court reporter to
join in the sidebars. This gave us the idea of analyzing the official sidebar
transcripts as data on disturbances. Sidebars are indeed disturbances by
definition. They break the normal flow of interaction in the courtroom, and
the judge is often quite conscious of the fact that they annoy the jurors who
cannot hear or understand what is going on in the sidebars. To my knowledge,
sidebar transcripts have thus far not been systematically used as data in studies
on court interaction.
During this trial, 19 sidebars were held in the presence of the official court
reporter. The transcripts of these sidebars are the data analyzed for this paper.
Courtroom transcripts prepared by researchers from videotapes representing
phases immediately before and after sidebars differed from the corresponding
transcripts prepared by the court reporter only in very minor ways. This
indicates a high verbatim accuracy on the part of the court reporter (see,
however, the excellent discussion of Walker, 1986, on the myth of the
verbatim record). In the excerpts presented below, we reproduce the official
court reporter's transcripts, deleting only names and other identifiable terms
and adding necessary contextual information in parentheses [ ].
DISTURBANCES AND EXPANSIONS IN COURT: THE
QUESTION OF DATA
Since court proceedings are excessively scripted and well rehearsed, it is not
necessarily easy to observe deviations from the normal in court. This is
particularly true of trials where the parties are represented by skillful lawyers,
much less so of cases where lay persons are directly involved (for examples of
the latter, see Conley & O'Barr, 1990; Engeström & al., in press; Merry,
1990). In the case analyzed here, the absence of visible deviations became a
prominent problem. The litigating parties were very smooth, polite and
flexible  in  their  interactions.  Toward  the  end  of  the  two-week  trial,  we  were
increasingly worried because no data on disturbances was coming in on
videotape.
During the trial, procedural disagreements between the parties are commonly
handled by means of so called sidebars. When one party objects to a move by
the other party, either one or the judge will usually call a sidebar conference.
These conferences are short breaks in the procedure where the judge hears the
RETURNING TO COORDINATION BY CONTRACTION
The  most  typical  way  of  dealing  with  a  sidebar  is  that  of  returning  to  the
business as usual by means of a quick unilateral decision from the judge. This
is exemplified in excerpt #1.
Excerpt #1
[Direct examination of plaintiff`s witness Mr. W by the plaintiffs counsel
Mr. G]
Mr.  G:  Mr.  W.,  in  --  are  you  personally  aware,  given  your  special
knowledge, skill and expertise, of how much it actually costs to move people
from their homes and then to move them back into their homes?
Mr. W: I am aware of some of some of the costs, based on what we have
done in the past.
Mr. G: All right. And based upon your special knowledge and expertise,
what has it cost homeowners in the past in condominiums such as D [the name
of the complex under litigation]?
Mr. V [one of the two defence counsel]: Same objection, your honor.
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Mr. G: It is facts.
Mr. V: The objection wasn't on foundation.
[The judge leads the parties into a sidebar. The following takes place in the
judge's chambers without the presence of the jury.]
The judge: Maybe I am not tracking. Now, what is it that you say? There was
actual discovery on this?
Mr. G: Oh, yes, your honor. It was in the deposition.
The judge: So, let's go back, then. What was the basis for the objection?
Mr. V: Beyond the scope of the expert designation in the case. There was a
motion in limine granted to limit the experts to the scope of the expert witness
declaration filed by counsel. Nowhere is Mr. W. designated as an expert on
moving costs. He is an expert on costs to repair. He is a general contractor. And
this testimony goes beyond the scope of his designation, even if it was disclosed in
deposition.
The judge: All right. It it is overruled. I will consider the cost of repair. You
can proceed. [The parties return to the courtroom.]
The judge quickly eliminated this disturbance by means of one type of
authoritative silencing. He heard the arguments of both parties, then decided in favor
of the plaintiff without further discussion.
In spite of the rather straightforward nature of this interaction, certain hesitation
and ambivalence may be observed even here. First the judge seems to regard the
very sidebar as unnecessary: "Maybe I am not tracking." He seems to be ready to
make a unilateral decision right away: "So, let's go back, then." But he backs up and
hears the defence argument. Only after that he reconfirms his initial decision.
The pattern of contraction by authoritative silencing was followed in 12 of the 19
sidebars.  In  every  single  one  of  those  there  were  interesting  minor
ambivalences, as if implying an emerging fundamental instability in this pattern.
TRANSITIONS TO COOPERATION
There were six sidebars in which an expansive transition into cooperation
(Figure  3.3)  took  place.  Instead  of  sticking  to  their  assigned  roles  as
adversaries and as an objective authority figure, the parties and the judge embarked
upon joint construction of a novel problem and novel solution. The production of
the new in these occasions resembles what Weick (1979) calls enactment and
Rittenberg (1985) characterizes as objectification of situated meaning. Excerpt #2
gives an example of such an expansive transition.
Excerpt #2
[Direct examination of plaintiff´s witness Ms. P by the plaintiff´s counsel Mr.
G]
Mr. G: Other than the water stain beneath that window on the wall and the water
stain in the living room ceiling, are there any other concerns or complaints
about the condition of your condominium?
Ms. P: Yes, there are. I also have -- Shall I go on?
Mr. G: Yes.
Ms. P: I didn't realize it was a problem, because the fire investigator --
Mr. V: Objection, your honor.
The judge: Sustained. What we are interested is things that you know about
rather than what somebody has told you.
Ms. P: I know about it now, though, because --
The judge: I mean, that you observed, you know, yourself, other than
something  that  somebody  said.  Go  ahead,  Mr.  G.  You  take  over  the
questioning. (Laughter)
Mr. G: Thank you, your honor.
Ms. P: I don't understand. I am sorry.
Mr. G: What are you talking about? What condition have you seen that you
are now concerned about?
Mr. V: Could I have a sidebar for a minute, please? [The
following held in chambers between the judge and counsel.]
Mr. G: I am doing the best I can.
Mr. V: I understand. I think the danger that we are running into now is the
area where she is going to testify that a fire investigator - meaning Mr. H, in his
volunteer fire department uniform -- came into her house and took out her light
fixture. That's the testimony that was the subject of a motion in limine --
The judge: All right.
Mr. V: -- whether a fireman or a fire investigator determined that her light
fixtures were a fire hazard. And that's the testimony that I wanted to avoid before
we tried to unring the bell.
The judge: That makes sense. We've already talked about it. Can you --will
she avoid that? Will you talk to her about that?
Mr. G: I will whisper in her ear and say, "Don't mention anything about what
somebody else said, and don't mention what he was wearing."
Mr.  V:  If  she  is  talking  about  Mr.  W  and  the  fire  investigator  in  the
chimney, I don't have a problem with that. But if we are talking about Mr. H in his
fireman's uniform, that's where we have the problem.
The judge: Just spend a minute and lay out to her the fact that she should just
avoid referencing Mr. H and what he was dressed in or what he represented
himself to be. He already testified. The jury knows. And go from there.
Mr. V: I have no objection if Mr. G leads Ms. P through the testimony. The
judge: Okay. That's thoughtful. She is nervous, so that might help.
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Here the counsel and the judge are facing an unexpected problem. Essentially, the
witness does not understand a crucial part of the script, namely the so called
hearsay rule which prohibits using what others have told as evidence. The sidebar
turns into shared problem solving. This is triggered by the initial disarming utterance
of Mr. G: "I am doing the best I can." This unusually personal statement receives a
sympathetic response from Mr. G's adversary: "I understand." Here the problem is
redefined as no more an issue of contest. It becomes an issue of finding a mutually
acceptable way of coaching or guiding the witness.
The rather striking innovation produced in this episode is that the defence counsel
actually suggests that Mr. G should "lead Ms. P through the testimony." In the
script, leading a witness is prohibited equally strictly as using hearsay. Now,
however, the parties and the judge all agree that leading the witness is exactly what
must be done. In other words, to avoid breaking the hearsay rule, another rule must
be broken by joint decision.
Especially Mr. G and the judge use the linguistic tools of personalization and
familiarization - recourse to everyday language - to achieve this expansive
transition. The judge concludes die sidebar using the non-legalistic words
"thoughtful", "nervous", and "help".
On the other hand, Mr. V uses the meta-linguistic tool of reflecting on the
preceding discourse: "And that's the testimony that I wanted to avoid before we
tried to unring the bell." The judge joins in, reflecting on a longer history of
previous discussions: "That makes sense. We've already talked about it."
Perhaps the most sophisticated tool is used by Mr. G when he employs
reported speech (Volosinov, 1971; Goffman, 1974; Goodwin, 1991) in a
proactive, anticipatory fashion: "I will whisper in her ear and say, 'Don't mention
anything about what somebody else said, and don't mention what he was wearing.'"
In the other five sidebars displaying a transition to cooperation, similar tools were
used. Excerpt #3 is another example of the effective use of personalization.
Excerpt #3
Mr. S: (...) I could be wrong, Bob [addressing Mr. G], and if you have
something.
The judge: All right. I am going to allow you to cross on this and if you are
correct you'll look fine. If you are not correct...
Mr. S: I'll look silly.
The judge: Then you wouldn't look fine.
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In a similar vein, excerpt #4 demonstrates the use of familiarization.
Excerpt #4
Mr. G: My thinking is that, in the first 5, 10, 15 minutes that they [the jury]
are in there, we can quickly consider those items and get them into them
The judge: Sure.
Mr. G: -- while they are still talking about the C's [name of the local
baseball team].
ATTEMPTS AT REFLECTIVE COMMUNICATION
In one of the sidebars, there is a piece of discourse that seems to differ
qualitatively from both authoritative silencing and cooperation.
Excerpt #5
[Held in the judge's chambers without the presence of the jury]
The judge: All right. I am going to allow him. But this is the other side of a
problem that Mr. S experienced. And you can now -- both of you can -- so that --
the problems it causes, when new figures come in, and by making somebody
available the night before at 5:15 really doesn't comply with what I have in mind in
terms of the "spirit of cooperation." It might have been the only time that he was
available or the time that you were available, but, really, when I -- if I make this kind
of ruling in the future -- what I mean by that, to both counsel, is that you set up a
time that's convenient for the other person and really break your backs to get that
information.
In this excerpt, the judge is teaching or reminding the attorneys to follow the rules
of cooperation. In that sense, the script itself as well as the interaction of the
participants become the foci of attention. These are hallmarks of reflective
communication (recall Figure 4). Yet there is something peculiarly non-
communicative in the discourse. The judge is in effect presenting a monologue to
which the attorneys do not respond in any noticeable way. The content is reflective
communication, the form is non-communication.
When the judge refers to the "spirit of cooperation" he is not just talking about a
general principle. He is referring to the contents of an issues conference, a special
meeting he had with the attorneys immediately before the trial. This meeting is
actually a tool with which this judge attempts to achieve reflective communication
between himself and the parties of the trial.
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The delay reduction program officially adopted by the court introduced a
mandatory disposition conference to be held in good time before the trial. The
issues conference, however, is the judge's own invention. In his interview, he
characterized these two as follows.
The judge: The delay reduction program really is generated by the control
of the case from the very first time that it's filed and answered, with
mandatory deadlines for certain things to happen. And about two months
before trial, the final thing before trial is the disposition conference. And they
have to prepare a joint document, both sides or all sides, listing all their
witnesses, all the issues they say are still unresolved, instructions, things that
were  unheard  of  to  do  ahead of  time.  Back when I  still  was  practicing,  you
never knew who the other side's witnesses even were, and now you know two
months ahead of time.
Interviewer: Did you have a disposition conference in this case?
The judge: No, because I had the case managed so that I told them to file
their witness list and things, they did it on an informal basis.
Interviewer: So you didn't have to have it all at once in writing?
The judge: Exactly. And they were working well enough together so I
didn't require them to file this formal disposition conference document that
requires both their signatures. But that funnel-shaped item is a reduction with
dates and fines, money fines, sanctions, if you don't live up to them. Very
negative.
Interviewer: Now the issues conference, that is really your own tool. How
is that related to the disposition conference?
The judge: That disposition conference, that's a formal document. And I
take  the  disposition  conference  report,  and I  say,  okay,  this  is  what  you've
said, but now we're right down to trial, and what is the reality of this?
Interviewer: So the issues conference is really about the trial in actual
practice?
The judge: Right, exactly. And we are going to trial on this. They've
been sent out -- Every case, two months ahead of time, files a disposition
report, conference report. But not every case goes down to trial. And these
people actually are, they show up at my door step, supposedly ready for trial.
Now, because I'm usually in trial, I'm not ready for 'em that day. So I'll have
an issues conference for them, which says, now you've said you're ready for
trial, but let's make sure we are.
(...)
The judge: I mean, we talked over some potential things. It gets timelines
set up and gets when people expect things to happen, and gets em in the frame
of mind that I want them in when they try a case here.
(...)
Interviewer Did you invent that or did you learn it from somebody else?
The judge: No, I invented it because I found that I was talking about the
same  things  with  these  people  in  front  of  me,  the  same  time,  so  I  just  started
keeping a list and then I'd add something. Then I made the list, then I typed it
out. Then I put, y´know, it just grew, just one of those things that grew. But
it's helpful.
The list to which the judge is referring is an artifact created by the judge to
sustain and consolidate the innovation. It is his standard agenda for an issues
conference. It contains 17 items. The last item on it is simply "Work together".
According to the judge, one of the aims of the issues conference is to make
sure the parties will focus on the essential questions in the case, not confusing
the jury by diverting into insignificant details. Another aim is to reduce the
anxiety of the parties, to get them to collaborate and interact self-consciously.
These aims speak of the judge's intention to reach reflective communication in
the process of complex litigation.
We taperecorded the two-hour issues conference preceding the case. The
contents of the conference corresponded to the agenda.
On the quality of interaction:
The judge: Ah, so, I just want you to understand that I don't, I don't want
me, er, to sound like I'm lecturing you but that is a real important thing, as I
sit here, that I wasn't as sensitive to, ah, when I was sitting where you are. So
I  am  now,  and  that  will  be  a  lot  of  my,  my  feeling  as  to  keep  the  jury,  ah,
respectful of the process. It's real important. Now, with that in mind, it's the
philosophy I want between you two, and I say two because of the size, I don't
know who will  be  trying  the  case,  is  that  I  want  you to  assist  each  other  in
putting your cases on. The time for gamesmanship, or trial by ambush or, ah,
tactics  that  make  the  other  attorney  look  bad,  ah,  are  over,  as  far  as  I'm
concerned.  So,  when  -  when  Mr.  G,  when  your  witnesses  are  going  on,  on
Monday  afternoon,  or  Tuesday,  ah,  I  want  you  to  tell  Mr.  S  who  they  are
going to be, and about how long they'll take. I'll direct, Mr. S I want you to
do exactly the same thing. Everything in this courtroom applies both ways, so,
eh, when your case is on I want you to cooperate with each other.
On the mutual definition of the object:
The judge: (...)  Ah, take a look at his verdict form. The only reason that I
want,  and  I  want  you,  if  there's  something  dreadfully  wrong  with  it  or  if  it
doesn't,  or  if  it  isn't  this  case  that  we're  trying,  then  I  want  you to  prepare  a
verdict form that you think reflects the case. The reason is simple. PM [name
of another judge] was talking about this early, about a year and a half ago
when I first started. And I thought it  was ludicrous until  I  had about twenty
trials where at the last day of trial nobody could agree on the verdict form
because they had been trying, essentially, a different case. They said, "Well,
gee, we, we didn't present any evidence on these elements here, you know.
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because we thought we were trying this case over here." And this is the last
day of trial. Then what will I do? Well I've learned if, if you at least show
each other the verdict form early in the case, ah, if there's a great deal of
difference then, ah, let me know. I mean, I'll look at them both and it will give
me an idea anyway. At least I know that you agree on what elements of each,
ah, cause of action. (...) Ah, I don't care if you agree at this point. I just want
you to have exchanged one. Or if you're satisfied with the one that's produced,
fine. We're trying the same lawsuit. You don't have to agree to individual
language. But you know what I'm talking about. Mr. G: Yes, sir.
The  judge  effectively  uses  reported  speech,  among  other  means,  as  a  tool  to
convince the attorneys. Yet there is no interaction except the mandatory "yes,
sir" from one of the attorneys. In the issues conference, the attorneys took
initiative and talked actively only in matters requiring technical coordination
for the trial. In other words, the communicative contents were all but nullified
by the non-communicative form of the discussion.
What could be the reason for this? Obviously it may the judge's habitual
dominating or lecturing style that precludes interaction. But the attorneys were
experienced and not at all timid. They could have responded more actively if
they wanted.
A more plausible explanation is found in the post-trial interviews of the
attorneys. First the plaintiff´s side.
Interviewer: He [the judge] also uses what he calls the issues conference
just before the trial. We were actually present when that took place on Friday
just before the trial. And, I was wondering, did you find it useful? First of
all, is that a common procedure?
Mr. G: Oh, it's usually that it's a month before the trial.  Three weeks to a
month. And it is important to do that three weeks to a month, from both
parties' point of view. And I was critical of the judge for having and holding
that issues conference so soon before trial. Things occurred in trial. Now, it
was a very efficiently run trial and it went fast. But there were several
sidebars there that occurred that wouldn't have occurred had they been talked
about in the issues conference. We also call it a disposition conference, the
terms are used interchangeably. And, you talk about the law. Like, what's the
law here? [laughs] What are you going to tell  the jury the law is? And, let's
rule on the admissibility of some of these exhibits before we go and prepare
them or blow them up.
Then the defence side.
Interviewer: There is a particular situation where we were actually
present. And that was what he [the judge] calls the issues conference, which
was just the last Friday before the actual trial. And it seemed to be somewhat
of an invention of the judge. He has this list of things that he went through.
What did you think about it, was that useful or sensible?
Mr. S: Actually it's very useful and that's one of the new things that our
court  system has,  it's  called  'the  fast  track".  And this  is  part  of  the  fast  track
procedures. The idea is that we're gonna have this issues conference, usually
that occurs about a month before trial, to sit down and make the attorneys have
this case ready for trial a month beforehand. So that when the trial comes, we
can get it done a lot more quickly and efficiently. They tell you, you
determine what evidence is gonna come in, what witnesses are gonna be there,
work out all your problems, come with a list of what the exhibits are, and
basically you're ready to go with trial and it's gonna go smoothly on this game
plan.
Interviewer: This time you had it just before the trial.
Mr. V: Because the subs [the subcontractors] were still in.
Mr. S: It was all because the subs were still in and he didn't want to have
it until he made a decision as to whether or not the subs were gonna get out.
Because if the subs were involved, it would have been much more complicated.
Interviewer: Did you feel it was problematic so close to the actual trial
date?
Mr. S: We didn't. The plaintiff did.
So both attorneys confuse the issues conference with the disposition
conference. This is something the judge explicitly rejected in his interview
cited above, empathically pointing out the crucial difference between the two
conferences. Somehow the judge's entire innovation has been misunderstood
by the litigating attorneys. This is a prime example of a rupture that
effectively prevents an expansive transition from being realized. One wonders
what would have happened had the judge prepared the attorneys by simply
telling them the same things about the issues conference he told us.
THE INVISIBLE BATTLEGROUND
The data presented above tell about the zone of proximal development as an
invisible battleground. In the ongoing work activity, disturbances occur
continuously. Disturbances are dealt with both regressively and expansively.
Innovative solutions appear. But innovations may be blocked by ruptures in the
intersubjective understanding between the participants of the activity system.
In Figure 3.1, I presented a tentative picture of the zone of proximal
development in the work activity of courts. The judge in the present case was
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an  active  proponent  of  the  delay  reduction  program  and  the  so  called
independent calendar adopted by the court. Both are reforms that might be
placed in the individually mastered cost-effective case management represented
by field 3 of Figure 3.1. However, the judge's attempt to reach reflective
communication by means of the issues conference is more characteristic of the
informal and interactive teamwork represented by field 4 in Figure 3.1.
Perhaps the persistent lecturing style in his approach to the attorneys
represents the heavy tradition of field 1.
The expansive transitions found in the sidebars could not have been achieved
by the judge alone. To the contrary, excerpt #2 is a good example of a
transition in which the innovation emerges through an effort pretty equally
distributed between the two attorneys and the judge. What is missing is
conscious input from the lay witness, or lay clients more generally. Perhaps
this would be going to the far end of the current zone of proximal
development in complex litigation work?
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4. TWISTING THE SCRIPTS: HETEROGENEITY
AND SHARED COGNITION IN MULTI-
PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL TEAMS
INTRODUCTION
In the conceptual models of coordination, cooperation and communication
presented in Chapter 3, the notion of script deserves special attention. Scripts
evolve historically to codify and regulate standard procedures in repeatedly
occurring cultural situations. Although the script may be available in a quite
explicit form (e.g., as a written formula or rule), the participants in a scripted
event are seldom aware of the script they are following. The script has an
algorithmic, stepwise character, dictating the sequence of events from the
beginning to the end. In cognitive psychology, a script is characterized as
follows.
"(...) the script is basically an ordered sequence of actions appropriate to a particular spatial-temporal
context, organized around a goal. The script is made up of slots and requirements of what can fill
these slots. That is, the script specifies roles and props and defines obligatory and optional actions by
actors who fill reciprocal roles. For each slot there are default values that are assumed if the person,
object, or action is not specified when the script is instantiated in a particular context. For
example, in the prototypical restaurant script a waiter or waitress is assumed, as are a menu, food, a
bill, and a tip. Persons hearing a story about a restaurant can readily fill in these items from their
general script knowledge." (Nelson, 198S, p. 40; see also Nelson, 1981; Schank & Abelson,
1977).
While cognitive scientists use the notion of script primarily to understand and
characterize individual cognition, my research will focus on the cultural and
social aspects of script-related cognition. How do scripts emerge and develop
in teams located in different cultural contexts? How do team members jointly
follow, violate, modify and change their scripts?
Due to its rule-like character, the script is a very peculiar cultural artifact. It
could be characterized as a tool turned into a rule. In the present context, I will
distinguish between the script and artifacts that have predominantly a tool-like
instrumental function. Such artifacts are important mediators of organizational
cognition (e.g., Engeström, 1991, Chapter 6; Gagliardi, 1990).
In the models depicting coordination, cooperation and communication (see
Chapter 3), artifacts, including linguistic tools, should be located as mediators
between the actors and the objects. On the other hand, such conventionalized
and ready-made ways of packaging speech as Bakhtin's (1986) speech genres
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are more accurately viewed as implicit constraints or rules rather than tools of
interaction. In this sense, speech genres are very closely related to scripts.
The form and contents of spoken interaction in group meetings may be
strongly dependent on the external artifacts used by the participants before and
during the meeting (Virkkunen, 1991). Such artifacts may be divided into
*preparatory artifacts (e.g., written agendas and notes);
* process-monitoring artifacts (e.g., spatial arrangements and positionings in
the meeting room, forms of record keeping in the meeting);
*orienting, evidentiary or argumentative artifacts (e.g., models, pictures,
statistics, etc. used to focus attention on a topic or object, or to support and
illustrate one's argument); and
*transmission-implementation artifacts (e.g., documents containing the
decisions of the meeting, to be distributed or used as legitimation devices).
There are at least three important dimensions to be observed in analyzing the
roles  and  uses  of  such  artifacts.  First, access: is the artifact shared by the
participants or is it used exclusively by one or some of them. Second,
penetration: does the artifact represent the objects of the work activity in the
external world or does it represent layers of 'pseudo-objects' functioning as
blankets of mufflers between the objects and the participants. Third, epistemic
function: do the artifacts function as prototypical examples and devices of
identification ('what' artifacts), as procedural instructions ('how' artifacts), as
diagnostic and explanatory models ('why' artifacts), or as ideological symbols
('where to' artifacts) (Engeström, 1990, p. 171-195).
In her pioneering work, Schwartzman (1987; 1989; see also Granström, 1986)
points out that meetings, although a pervasive form of organizational life, have
been largely taken for granted and neglected by researchers. Naturally the
detailed study of meetings must be embedded in observation and ethnography
of actual 'on-line' work practices. The conceptual framework presented above
and in Chapter 3 makes it possible to use meetings as particularly illuminating
'windows' into the developmental dynamics of teams.
THE SPECIFICITY OF MEDICAL TEAMS
Complex clinical procedures such as demanding surgeries self-evidently
require collaborative teamwork. However, in such operative teams there is
usually a very clear vertical command structure which makes the team more
like a commando task force dedicated to a single purpose than a general-
purpose form of organizing cooperative work and enhancing horizontal
exchange of information across potential boundaries. Ideas of the latter type
are fairly recent in health care.
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Multiprofessional health care teams have been increasingly used and written
about ever since the late sixties (e.g., Beloff & Willet, 1968; Lashof, 1968;
Horwitz, 1970). One of the pioneering texts was Alberta Parker's (1972)
monograph The Team Approach to Primary Health Care. Parker (1972, p. 10)
listed five characteristics of a functioning primary care team: (1) team
members provide care to a common group of patients; (2) team members
develop common goals for patient outcome and work to reach these goals; (3)
appropriate roles and functions are assigned to and accepted by each team
member, (4) the team possesses a mechanism that enables all to contribute and
share information essential for effective patient care; (5) the team possesses a
mechanism to ensure that patient care plans are implemented, services are
coordinated, activities are administered, and the performance of the team is
evaluated.
In practice, health teams are commonly confronted with difficulties that stem
from the heavy traditions of craft professionalism and bureaucracy. As Tichy
(1977, p. 7) notes, the health teams' "internal structure often has tended to
replicate that of the hospital hierarchy." In a similar vein, Bruce (1980, p.
165) points out that "cooperation between professionals has not been found to
result automatically either from physical proximity or from being involved
with the same client."
Health care teams and their operating contexts are special in at least three
respects. First, health care teams are often comprised of professions with very
different training, ideology, and status and with a tradition of more or less
open tensions between each other. Second, at least larger health care
institutions have traditionally been very centralized and dominated by strong
autocratic leaders, mostly MD's by profession. Third, frontline health care
teams deal with clients who can decide whether they will or will not follow the
recommendations of the professionals; thus the success of the team is dependent
on the involvement and cooperation of the patient, which makes the client
something of a co-producer of the services.
In the following, I will present data from two examples of health team
interaction. I will analyze the examples with the help of the theoretical
framework suggested above. The first example is a meeting between a client
and two collaborating professionals, in the home of the client. The second
example is a meeting of a primary health care team conducted at the health
station. The data are taken from two successive projects of developmental
work research in Finnish health centers. Project LEVIKE and The Working
Health Center Project. In oder to understand the cases, the reader should know
that since 1972, every Finnish municipality is required by law to organize a
health center that offers comprehensive primary health care services to the
inhabitants free of charge. Health center personnel work in health stations as
well as in schools and preventive guidance clinics.
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CASE 1: THE OLD WOMAN AND THE PROFESSIONALS
Health centers and municipal social welfare agencies offer partially
overlapping services in Finland, typically to clients like the elderly and
alcholics. To coordinate services and avoid excessive use of resources, the two
branches are trying out various rudimentary forms of teamwork in many
municipalities.
In case 1, such a form of teamwork was being developed between the home health
care of the elderly (a function of the health center) and the home services for the
elderly (a function of the social welfare services). The former delivers medical
services to old people living at home but suffering from chronic illnesses. The
latter delivers services such as cooking, cleaning, shopping, and often making
sure the clients are taking their prescribed medications. The former services are
typically delivered by home nurses who visit the home usually not more than once
a week. The latter services are delivered by home service assistants who may visit
the home even on a daily basis. Health visitors are trained nurses, medically
supervised by physicians. Home service assistants don't necessarily have any
special training for their job. They are supervised by a home service supervisor,
usually trained as a social worker.
In this particular city, the health care and social welfare services were
integrated administratively. But at the level of daily work, the two remained
relatively isolated. The two branches decided to start ground level team
collaboration by sending home nurses and home service assistants together to their
shared patients in order to create a shared care plan for the client in question. The
care plan is a structured document initially developed and used by nurses in the
health sector.
In this case, the patient is an 80-year old woman. While being mentally and verbally
quite alert, she has difficulties in moving around. The home service assistant visits
her daily. The home nurse visits her approximately once a week. She is generally
cosidered "a difficult patient" or "a difficult client" by the professionals.
The conversations that occurred between the home nurse (called nurse for short),
the home service assistant (called assistant for short), and the patient (called Alma
in the conversation) during this visit were tape recorded by another employee of
the health center. She was otherwise not directly involved with the work of either
one of the two professionals. The following excerpts illustrate the structure of
interaction during this visit.
The participants have been discussing the patient's various medications and related
symptoms.
Excerpt 1
1 Patient: Dr. A gave me O [name of a tranquilizer], and I took two pills a
night. One nurse almost got a stroke when she saw it. So one would be enough,
not more in any case. Then it was reduced.
2 Nurse: Perhaps that, anyway. Are you writing these down for yoursef? [to
the assistant]
3 Assistant: Yes.
4 Nurse: And that tranquilizer thing. It could be her problem, using
tranquilizers. Now it's not, if she wouldn't use those...
5 Patient: [speaking over the nurse] I had such a terrible pain on Saturday,
such a hard pain.
6 Nurse: Should we write down that she likes to take extra pills of O, grown
fond of O [name of the tranquilizer]?
7 Assistant: Hm. I'll make a clean copy of this, then.
[Short pause; both professionals read their versions of the care plan.]
In this excerpt, the patient initiates discussion on tranquilizers and tells that her
prescribed dose has been reduced. The nurse picks up the topic and states that the
patient has a problem of excessive use of tranqulizers - an interpretation not at all
coordinated with what the patient told. The professionals then proceed to
formulate a statement about the patient's tendency to excessive use in their care plan
document, ignoring the patient's remark about a terrible pain (turn 05).
Excerpt 2
1 Nurse: Then there's the functioning of the stomach. It's one...probably the
biggest one.
2 Assistant: Yes.
3 Nurse: And for that we have this trip notebook?
4 Assistant: Yes, there's again in it, I guess, yeah, I guess, from the weekend,
(she is referring to a trip notebook in which all the home service staff who
visit the patient are supposed to enter their notes concerning the visit; during
the weekend other home service staff than the regular assistant have visited the
patient]
5 Assistant: On Friday I wrote down...
6 Nurse: Which Friday, this?
7 Assistant: Yes. I wrote down kind of... about the whole week.
8 Nurse: Yes.
9 Nurse: The stomach has been constipated again.
10 Assistant: I wonder if Saturday's visitor has even read this?
11 Nurse: Yes.
12 Assistant: Probably not... Hm, I was thinking [lowering her voice] if Alma
has told...?
84 85
13 Nurse: Just so.
14 Assistant: Since this has been all week now.
15 Nurse: Yes, the last time I looked at the trip notebook it said the stomach
has funcioned well.
16 Patient: Don't I have something to say about my own care?
17 Nurse [raising her voice]: Yes, of course.
18 Patient: It can't be dictated by others, can it? According to the existing
law...
19 Nurse: We are just checking, checking out the functioning of the stomach.
20 Patient: According to the existing law.
21 Nurse: Yes, we are only looking into the functioning of that stomach,
because.
22 Patient: All the time I feel like my bowels were moving, but nothing comes.
23 Nurse: Yes.
24 Patient: It is...
25 Nurse: Well, according to this trip notebook, however, the stomach is
functioning.
26 Patient: It contracts and contracts, the muscle, but only very thin stuff
comes out...
27 Nurse [speaking over the patient]: But according to this notebook, the
stomach functions anyway... every day [lowering her voice toward the end].
Here the patient interrupts and confronts the professionals, forcefully
demanding their attention (turns 16, 18, and 20). The patient claims her
stomach does not function. The nurse responds by referring to the trip
notebook according to which the patient's stomach has functioned every day
during the week. Suddenly we are in the absurd situation where the
professionals hold their notebook contents as evidence against the patient's
claim about her quite personal life functions.
These excerpts are representative of a long series of confrontations during the
visit. All follow the basic pattern, with variations in contents and in degrees of
aggravation.
The structure of this sequence of interaction may be interpreted as follows.
The professionals are interacting quite intensively. Their script is the structure
of the care plan. They focus on the construction of a shared care plan for the
patient. It his sense, their interaction looks like genuine cooperation. However,
the care plan effectively muffles the voice of the patient. It is a substitute object
that prevents the professionals from focusing on the patient as subject.  In other
words, the interaction has the structure of pseudo-cooperation.
The professionals use the trip notebook as a mediating artifact from which they
glean  information  for  the  construction  of  the  care  plan.  It  is  used  as  an
evidentiary or argumentative artifact, to prove that the patient's stomach has
actually been functioning, no matter what the patient says. With regard to
access, the professionals 'own' the trip notebook while the patient is excluded
from using it. With regard to penetration, the trip notebook could well be used
as a means for discussing the patient's needs - now it is restrictively
subordinated to the peparation of the care plan. With regard to its epistemic
function, the trip notebook is used as a 'what' artifact, helping to identify and
classify 'facts' about the patient.
The structure of the pseudo-cooperation in this episode is complicated by the
active presence of the patient. She has her own object: her felt needs, her
desire to be acknowledged as a subject of her own. She is following a
grievance script, taking up a long string of problems and needs, one at a time -
and thus disturbing time and again the professionals' agenda of constructing an
appropriate care plan document. This tension takes the form of repeated
discoordinations, from occasions where the professionals ignore what the
patient says to occasions of open confrontation.
This complex structure of pseudo-cooperative and simultaneously extremely
discoordinated interaction is schematically depicted in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: The structure of discoordinated pseudo-cooperation in case 1
This case demonstrates how the care plan which originally is supposed to
function as a shared tool can be turned into a monstrous caricature, a pseudo-
object, that dictates the interaction of the professionals instead of helping them
to interact with the patient. Such a displacement is not uncommon. The case
86 87
also demonstrates how helpless team members can be when faced with a
demanding client - a live object from the outside world. The discoordinations do
not lead into innovations and expansive transitions. They are met with various
forms of evasion.
CASE 2: THE TEAM AND THE HIERARCHY
My  second  example  is  taken  from  a  joint  meeting  of  two  teams  working  at  a
health station. The teams have been functioning for two years. They consist of the
personnel responsible for treating ill patients in consultations at the station and in
home care. Each team comprises of four physicians, two assistant nurses, a nurse
working at the station, and home care personnel who are mainly in the field and
usually represented by one or two home nurses in team meetings. Each team is
responsible for a given sub-population and the corresponding geographical area.
The teams don't have fixed leaders. All team members regardless of profession
take turns as coordinators. The teams meet separately once a week. Once a month
they have a joint meeting.
The principle of population responsibility pertains to the teams. The teams have
an outspoken stance for autonomy and self-initiative in decisions concerning their
own  work.  But  there  are  other  functions  in  this  health  center  that  are  not
organized on the basis of population responsibility. At this fairly small station,
the  laboratory  represents  such  a  function.  It  is  still  supervised  by  a  head  nurse
specially in charge of the laboratory sector and located at the central board of
health in the administrative center of this relatively large city. There is a history
of tensions between the teams and the laboratory, as well as between the teams
and the traditional sectorially organized administration in general.
The meeting takes place in September 1991. The previous summer, the central
administration  closed  the  laboratory  in  order  to  save  money.  There  is  a  strong
possibility that the head nurse in charge of the laboratory sector will propose
closing that laboratory permanently. The closings do not threaten the jobs of the
lab personnel; they are transfered to a bigger station with a bigger lab.
In the meeting, the teams discuss the closing. They have prepared a draft letter to
the central administration demanding that the laboratory shall not be closed.
About fifteen team members, two representatives of the laboratory, and the chief
physician of the district where the station was located participated in the meeting.
The following statement by a home nurse was quite typical of the turns taken by
the team members in the discussion.
Excerpt 1
01 Home nurse: Well, for home care, at least, during the summer we had such a
situation that we had summer substitutes, and they are usually students. And they
don't necessarily even know how to take laboratory samples. Their skill with the
needle is so meager that taking samples doesn't  work. So the samples had to be
taken by the few permanent home nurses. And the number of samples to be taken
is the same as usual, even more in the past summer. Some of the patients refused
to  go  to  L  (the  next,  bigger  station  which  had  a  functioning  laboratory).  They
have the strength to come to our station, but to L they need to take a taxi, or it's
otherwise such an unfamiliar, frightening, big place where they don't find their
way to the laboratory, particularly the elderly patients. So their opinon was that
they  cannot  go  to  have  lab  samples  taken in  L.  So we had to  take  them,  so  we
nurses had a very busy summer, indeed. And we used quite a lot of our precious
time for driving those samples to L for analysis. And there's one more point,
namely that particularly serum samples are so sensitive that they are easily
spoiled  in  the  car,  being  transported  from  one  place  to  another.  In  the  lab  the
sample can be immediately stored in an appropriate place. But when they are
driven around in car in the hot summer weather...
After this statement, other related issues were discussed for about five minutes.
During that time, the chief physician expressed her support to the teams in their
effort  to  secure  the  continuing laboatory  services  at  their  station.  However,  she
advised them to formulate their letter so that the central administration cannot
find any counter-arguments in it. After this, the following exchange took place.
Excerpt 2
1 Team physician: I think it's noteworthy that samples are getting spoiled.
They must be redone several times. It costs money. On the other hand, the
patient has to come to tests several times. And she may come to consultation to
ask for results, but the sample has been spoiled again.
2 Lab nurse: Well, lab samples do not get spoiled in car transportation. Our
samples make a long tour in a taxi...
3 Home nurse: Ah, yes...
4 Lab nurse: ... and there are containers for cold transportation. Samples do
not get spoiled in a car. If they are spoiled, it happens already when they are
taken.
5 Team physician: Maybe they were spoiled because of these inexperienced
summer substitutes. But mat's the same...
6 Chief physician: ...Since there was no lab personnel to take those samples. It
does require professional skill, doesn't it?
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07  Lab  nurse:  Well,  sure  professional  skill.  But  in  transport  they  won't  get
spoiled. That's what I wanted to point out.
This sequence is typical of the structure of interaction. The team members
testify that the closing of the lab had disastrous effects on the patients as well as
on the staff. The chief physician supports them, with admistrative
qualifications. And a few times the laboratory nurse interrupts, pointing out
that some of the arguments have not been adequate, as if indicating that the
participants lack knowledge of the special sphere of the laboratory. However,
the lab representatives do not openly oppose to the letter drafted for the
administration. When asked directly of their opinion, they merely point out
that it was not them who decided to close the lab. The discussion results in the
acceptance of the letter.
This sequence is dominated by the team agenda of protesting against the closing
of the lab. The discussion proceeds in coordination along the lines of the script
that aims at the acceptance of the letter. However, there is a latent competing
script, represented by the laboratory staff. It manifests itself in occasional
discoordinations, such as the one in the excerpt above.
The full objects of the team members and the laboratory staff are never spelled
out;  they  can  only  be  inferred.  I  suggest  that  the  object  for  the  teams  is  to
establish the population responsibility as the rationale of the work at the
station. The object for the laboratory representatives is to establish the
legitimacy of sectorial specialism as the rationale of their work at the station.
The chief physician's object seems to be twofold: population responsibility on
the one hand, administrative rationality on the other hand.
The following exchange that occurred almost at the end of this part of the
meeting indirectly illuminates the objects of the teams and laboratory staff
respectively.
Excerpt 3
1 Team assistant nurse: We could naturally invite the head nurse of the
laboratory sector to come and get acquainted with our activity. I've worked
here for six years but I've never met her at the station. I wonder how much
she knows  about  our activity  and  about  work  based  on  population
responsibility. She pretty seldom visits here.
2 Laboratory nurse: We do meet her quite often, but...
3 Team assistant nurse: ...yes, but to visit here. I mean how much does she
know about our way of working. We could give her an orientation and tell her
about our idea.
After the letter to the administration was accepted, the floor was given to the
laboratory nurse so she could tell about the needs of the lab. She complained at
length about the way laboratory work is constantly being disturbed by patients
coming at a wrong time, not being well enough informed and instructed by
staff in teams.
Excerpt 4
1 Laboratory nurse: ...So that patients should not be sent in vain to our door.
But maybe they come even on their own...
2 Team assistant nurse: I do think lots of them come on their own. After all,
they have been waiting for two and half months.
This little exchange exemplifies how this part of the meeting is a mirror image
of the preceding part. This time the lab staff go through their own agenda, but
they are disturbed by an occasional remark from the teams, such as the one
above in turn 02.
The structures of interaction in these two steps of the discussion are presented
in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: The two-step structure of coordination-discoordination in case 2
It is noteworthy that the only artifact ostensibly used in these parts of the
meeting was the text of the draft letter. It was not distributed to the
participants, only read to them by the team assistant nurse chairing the
meeting. There was no concrete discussion on the specific contents of the
letter. As such, the draft text seemed to function as a symbol of the identity of
the teams rather than as an instrument of discussion. On the other hand, the
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ter surely was used as a transmission and implementation artifact, i.e., as a
message to the administration.
The rather straightforward coordination character of the interaction in the
meeting was altered at one point, after the lengthy presentation of grievances
by the laboratory nurse.
Excerpt 5
1 Team physician: Would it help if you put a big sign on the door of
laboratory, which would say 'Only with appointment and acute samples'...?
2 Lab nurse: ...We can put there such a sign.
3 Team physician: And 'If you don't have an appointment, you can go to L
station lab without appointment'. Not too much text, but so that patients will
realize that there is such an arrangement in place...
4 Lab nurse: ...Yes...
5 Lab nurse 2: As little text as possible.
During this exchange, there is a change in the atmosphere. The team physician
and the laboratory nurse both lean forward to look each other in the eyes. The
laboratory nurses and the physician are suddenly talking about the same
concrete object, out there in the 'real time' activity. The object nicely brings
together the interests of the population responsibility and the interests of the
laboratory specialists: informing patients will enhance their self-reliance and it
will also help the lab get some peace and quiet.
This is a small but important example of an innovation leading to an expansive
transition from coordination to cooperation. It did not resolve the tension
between the team (population responsibility) and the laboratory (sectorial
specialism) in any permanent manner. But it demonstrated that the tension is
not unsurmountable. It is also important that the innovation proposed by the
team physician did actually materialize. The sign is now out there, on the
laboratory door.
The structure of the cooperation momentarily reached in this episode is
depicted in Figure 4.3.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Both cases analyzed above deal with teams and teamwork in their early,
formative stages. In both cases, the dominant script has not yet been
crystallized. There is an ongoing search for a script, and a competition
between scripts represented by the voices of different participants.
Neither case exemplifies neatly any one of the three strategies found by
Ancona (1991), reviewed in Chapter 1 of this volume. In the first case, the
professionals went out to the object in what looks like an example of the
probing strategy. Yet they all but excluded their client, the patient, from the
interaction. In the second example, the team seemed to focus entirely on its
internal relations in a way that resembles Ancona's informing strategy. Yet
there was an innovation that momentarily changed the nature of the interaction
and led to a tangible artifactual product which can actually have impact on the
exchanges between the professionals and their clients.
The evolution of scripts and artifacts in teams is a fascinating object of
developmental study. More than that, our current research1 involves teaching
teams to analyze their meetings with the conceptual tools sketched above. Such
new  'meta  instruments'  may  or  may  not  change  the  way  teams  design  and
monitor their own work.
NOTE
1 The Working Health Center Project is involved in the transformation of work in 21 Finnish health
centers across the country. The researchers of this project, Osmo Saarelma, Kirsn Launis, Raija-
Leena Punamäki, Riitta Simoila, as well as Helena Rantala, have given valuable comments during the
preparation of this paper. The data used in case 1 was provided by Kirsti Launis.
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